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INTRODUCTION 
The current paper will examine the structure of 
mood (emotional levels which endure over time} and its 
relation to the structure of personality. Two models, one 
of mood and one of personality, will be explored in depth 
and compared. However, before I present in more detail the 
focus this work will take, I would like to present two 
rather broad conceptual notions which serve as the backdrop 
for the major hypotheses of this study. 
Scarr (1985}, in her recent article entitled 
Constructing Psychology: Making facts and fables for our 
time, noted that the field of psychology has a distinct 
preference for focusing on proximal rather than distal 
variables when examining human behavior. Proximal vari-
ables are those that are temporally near to the variable 
being measured (ie. mood states as a function of· the day's 
events}. Distal variables, on the other hand, are those 
that occur or exert their influence from a point well 
removed from the variable under study and are usually of a 
sociological or genetic nature (ie. personality or intelli-
gence variables that show a high heritability}. She argued 
that because distal variables have temporal priority over 
proximal variables, their inclusion into psychological 
research can add clarity to an area that is often clouded 
1 
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by correlational analyses of proximal variables. In sup-
port of her assertions, Scarr presented evidence from an 
analysis of the IQ's, communication skills, and social 
adjustments of children. In each case the proximal predic-
tor variables that contributed to these childhood measures 
were the amount of positive discipline and positive control 
that mothers were observed giving to their children. Those 
mothers who interacted more positively with their children 
had brighter, more communicative, and more socially adjus-
ted children. This was a plausible and seemingly straight-
forward finding. However, when Scarr analyzed the data on 
childhood functioning with the inclusion of distal predic-
tor variables, the picture that emerged was very different. 
It was found in every instance that the mothers' intelli-
gence (estimated by WAIS vocabulary scale scores) became 
the most significant predictor of the childhood measures. 
In all cases the mothers' intelligence was the variable 
that mediated "positive mothering" and, in almost all 
instances, the inclusion of the distal variable wiped out 
the significant association that had been observed between 
the proximal variables and the dependent measures. 
Her argument was that researchers wear the "blind-
ers of their cultural time period", and that in the current 
time period vision is focused most exclusively onto 
proximal variables so that the contribution of distal 
variables (like those above) often go unnoticed. 
3 
On a further conceptual note, Millon (1981), in his 
review of the history of personality theories, described 
. 
how many researchers and theorists "discovered'' ideas that 
were in fact very similar to ideas proposed by theorists 
from an earlier era, theorists from a different perspec-
tive, or even theorists from a different segment of the 
vast psychological literature. This is often unavoidable 
and unintended. However, it is unfortunate how often these 
similarities go unnoticed, leading to unnecessary debate 
over concepts that are very similar, but which go by 
deceptively dissimilar names. 
In the current paper attention will be focused on 
research that examines the structure of emotional exper-
ience and it will be seen that the thoughts of Scarr and 
Millon have application in this realm. The 1980's have 
been referred to as the decade of affect (Tomkins, 1981), 
and research within this domain has proliferated on many 
fronts. For example, significant research has been 
conducted on the influence of affect on cognitive process-
ing (Bower, 1981; Isen, 1984), the affective correlates of 
personality traits (Costa & McCrea, 1980, 1984; Mehrabian, 
1980; Plutchik,1980), the discrete components of emotional 
experience (Izard, 1972, 1977; Plutchik, 1962, 1980), the 
broad structure of affect found in ratings of facial 
expressions (e.g. Abelson & Sermat, 1962; Cliff & Young, 
1968; Green & Cliff, 1975), and the broad structure of 
affect found in ratings of self-reported mood (e.g. Diener 
& Emmons, 1984; Russell, 1978, 1979; Watson & Clark, 1984; 
Watson & Tellegen, 1985}. 
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It is the last category, that of self-reported 
mood, that has remained the most disarrayed. Only recently 
have researchers begun to outline the broadest dimensions 
of affective structure and approach a consensus. Prior to 
this work (Russell, 1978, 1979; Watson and Tellegen, 1985} 
various researchers had proposed that anywhere from four to 
12 factors were necessary to define the structure of affect 
(e.g., Borgatta, 1961; Hendrick & Lilly, 1970; Izard, 1972: 
Lorr, Datson & Smith, 1967; McNair, Lorr & Droppleman, 
1971; Nowlis, 1965; Thayer, 1967; Watson & Tellegen, 1985}. 
The above research, which has looked for and found many 
emotional factors, has generally sought a fine grained 
analysis of emotional experience in order to accurately 
define the discrete components of mood variation. Within 
this realm of analysis, confusion over the number, or the 
exact nature, of discrete emotional factors still remains. 
In contrast to this confusion, the area of greatest 
disagreement within two-factor models of affect concerns 
the proper rotation of dimensions within a factor analytic 
solution. Two-factor models of affect seek to define the 
broadest aspects of emotional variation, and within a two-
factor solution, there is not an a Qriori correct rotation. 
Rather, the most sensible rotation is found from the 
differential pattern of correlates that correspond to the 
dimensions extracted (Watson, Clark, and Tellegen, 1984; 
watson and Tellegen, 1985). 
5 
The most promising two-factor model has been one 
where the broad dimensions of positive affect and negative 
affect have been delineated. These dimensions have been 
shown to be independent of each other over time (Bradburn, 
1969; Harding, 1982; Warr, Barter, and Brownbridge, 1983), 
with each dimension showing distinct patterns of associ-
ation with other measures of personality (Costa and McCrea, 
1980, 1984) and well-being (Bradburn, 1969). 
Watson and Tellegen (1985) have recently begun to 
systematize and explicate the dimensions of positive affect 
and negative affect. Extensive evidence has been presented 
which delineates the importance of these two particular 
dimensions (e.g., Watson and Clark, 1984). They have been 
shown to have cross cultural stability (Watson, Clark, and 
Tellegen, 1984), and it has been shown that these two 
dimensions of affect emerge in both nomothetic factor 
analytic studies of a large numbers of subjects, and 
idiographic factor analytic studies of fewer subjects 
assessed repeatedly over time. 
The research conducted by Watson and Tellegen 
resulted in the model of affective structure depicted in 
Figure 1. Within this model, the dimension of Negative 
Affect is characterized by emotional distress, fear, 
Figure 1. The structure of emotional experience proposed by watson and 
Tellegen (1985), showing the major dimensions of Positive Affect 
(horizontal) and Negative Affect (vertical) am their relationship to 
the dimenSions of pleasantness am arousal ( ~t) . Adapted fran 
watson and Tellegen (1985). 
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nervousness, and hostility at the high end, and the exper-
ience of a calm, relaxed serenity at the low end. Positive 
Affect, on the other hand is characterized by feelings of 
elation, excitement, and enthusiasm on the high end, and 
the experience of sluggishness or fatigue on the low end. 
The dashed lines on the diagonals in Figure 1 represent an 
alternative two-factor solution, and are conceptualized 
within the current model to represent combinations of the 
dimensions of Positive and Negative Affect. 
Despite the advances that have been had through the 
development of this two-factor model of affect, the thesis 
of the present study is that this model is incomplete in 
its particulars. Research on this model is relatively new 
and the same methods of factor analysis have often resulted 
in the extraction of Positive and Negative Affect factors 
which show slightly different terms defining the major 
dimensions. Conceptually, the factors that emerge in any 
particular sample can be seen as proximal variables because 
connections to broad sources of variation which may mediate 
the observed relationship between terms has not been made. 
Numerous researchers have declared that more work is needed 
in order to further elucidate what gives rise to these 
dimensions (e.g., Diener and Emmons, 1984; Watson and 
Clark, 1984; Watson, Clark, and Tellegen, 1984), and it is 
argued here that an important conceptual link has been 
overlooked in this process. It is believed that this 
conceptual link will further elucidate what gives rise to 
these dimensions, and that there will be greater clarity 
over the precise nature of affective structure when the 
connection is made. 
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It is suggested that the model of affective 
structure presented in Figure 1 is "rediscovering'' dimen-
sions of individual differences that were delineated many 
years ago and that have already been extensively analyzed. 
Specifically, it is proposed that this two-factor model of 
affect may be describing, via emotional descriptors, the 
personality dimensions of introversion-extraversion (E) and 
neuroticism-stability (N) which have been outlined by Hans 
Eysenck over the past 30 years. Specifically, the 
dimension of Positive Affect is believed to be equivalent 
to the dimension of introversion-extraversion and the 
dimension of Negative Affect is believed to be equivalent 
to the dimension of neuroticism-stability. 
In addition to exploring how the model of affect 
presented in Figure 1 may be "rediscovering'' the dimensions 
outlined earlier by Eysenck, it will be argued that the E 
and N dimensions of ~ersonality fit Scarr's definition of 
distal variables. That is, these dimensions have been 
shown to be strongly influenced by genetic factors (Eaves 
and Eysenck, 1985), have strong longitudinal consistency 
(Conley, 1985), and show stability across all of the 26 
countries where cross cultural consistency has been 
9 
assessed (Barrett and Eysenck, 1984; Eysenck, Barrett, 
Spielberger, Evans, & Eysenck, 1986). As distal variables 
the E and N dimensions of personality will be included in 
an analysis of emotional structure. It is proposed that 
the inclusion of these dimensions will then help to clarify 
the exact nature of the dominant dimensions of emotional 
experience. 
This current paper begins with a selective histori-
cal review of the literature that deals with self-reported 
affect. This review culminates with a discussion of the 
major two-factor models of affective structure. Following 
this is a review of the E and N dimensions of personality. 
Next, research evidence which indicates the convergence of 
extraversion/Positive Affect and neuroticism/Negative 
Affect is presented. This review then culminates with a 
statement of the hypotheses for the present analysis. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
AFFECTIVE STRUCTURE 
As noted in the introduction, there has been a 
marked difference between studies that have analyzed self-
report data and studies that have analyzed non-self-report 
data. Research on non-self-report data has included 
analyses of vocal and facial expressions of emotion (e.g., 
Abelson & Sermat, 1962; Cliff & Young, 1968; Green & Cliff, 
1975; Russell & Bullock, 1985; Schlosberg, 1952), semantic 
differential ratings of mood terms (Averill, 1975; Block, 
1957), and judged similarities among mood words (Bush, 
1973, Russell, 1980, 1983). In almost all cases, this 
literature has discovered that two large bipolar dimensions 
of mood adequately describe the observed relationships. 
Invariably these dimensions have been a pleasure-displeas-
ure dimension and an arousal-sleepy dimension. At times a 
small and variously named (ie. potency, dominance, aggress-
ion or affection-rejection) third dimension has emerged 
from these studies as well (see Russell & Mehrabian, 1977), 
but this dimension, unlike the others, has not been readily 
replicated across studies or cultures (Russell, 1978, 
1983). 
Historically, studies of self-rated affect have 
been less clear, less interpretable, and less consistent 
than the studies mentioned above. As will be discussed 
10 
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below, various authors have claimed that between four and 
12 independent, monopolar factors are necessary to describe 
emotional structure. However, in recent years, methodo-
·logical corrections have been made and an approach to 
consensus is becoming apparent. More recent investigations 
on self-reported affect have discovered that when response 
biases are corrected and an adequate, representative sample 
of mood terms are used, two broad bipolar dimensions emerge 
from the self-report data. Despite this approach to 
consensus, there is disagreement over what constitutes the 
two most basic dimensions of affect. 
The two dominant researchers of the two-dimensional 
structure of self-reported affect are Russell (1978, 1979; 
Russell & Ridgeway, 1983), who argues that the two basic 
dimensions of affect are degree of arousal and degree of 
pleasure; and Watson and his colleagues (Watson & Clark, 
1984; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1984; Watson & Tellegen, 
1985; Zevon & Tellegen, 1982), who argue that the two 
broadest dimensions are Positive Affect and Negative 
Affect. 
As a side note, some recent research has proposed a 
circumplex model of affective structure (see Conte & 
Plutchik, 1981; Daly, Lancee & Polivy, 1983; Fisher, Heise, 
Bohrnstedt, & Lucke, 1985; Russell, 1980, 1983; Russell & 
Bullock, 1985). According to this model, affect terms are 
arranged in an ordered fashion around a circle in two-
12 
dimensional space. In this model the dimensions that are 
initially used to place terms in this circular space are 
deemed unimportant because the order and spacing of the 
terms on the circle defines their structure and "any 
particular axis is arbitrary and no more basic than any 
other" (Conte & Plutchik, 1981, p.70). This type of model 
is not as well researched as the dimensional models, and it 
is used generally as an indicator of the conceptual 
relationship between affect terms. Additionally, these 
researchers disregard the dimensional aspects of their data 
- which are essential to the hypotheses of this study. For 
these reasons, circumplex models of affect will not be 
considered here. Rather, an overview of early self-report 
research will be presented. Following that, a more 
detailed examination of the two-dimensional models put 
forth by Russell and by Watson will be conducted. 
Before beginning with a review of early affect 
research, however, it is important to note that the two-
dimensional models to be discussed, which are characterized 
by a small number of broad factors, are not inconsistent 
with the body of research that deals with more discrete 
emotional factors, which are characterized by a large 
number of narrow dimensions (see Bartlett & Izard, 1972; 
Watson & Tellegen, 1985). In fact, the discrete, unipolar 
emotions converge on the bipolar two-dimensional structure 
in a second order factor analysis (much like all of 
Cattell's 16 Personality Factors load on Eysenck's two 
dimensions of introversion-extraversion and neuroticism-
stability after a second order factor analysis). 
Early Research 
13 
Pioneering work on the factor analytic study of 
self-reported mood began in the 1950's with Nowlis (Nowlis 
& Nowlis, 1956) when he developed the Mood Adjective Check 
List. Nowlis began his work by hypothesizing that four 
bipolar dimensions (pleasantness-unpleasantness, activa-
tion-deactivation, positive-negative social orientation, 
and control-lack of control) would characterize mood 
structure. He gathered adjectives to measure each hypothe-
sized dimension and in a series of factor analytic studies 
(e.g. Green & Nowlis, 1957), found, much to his surprise, 
that the hypothesized bipolar dimensions tended to separate 
and form more discrete unipolar factors. This research 
finding, contrary to expectation, indicated that one could 
experience emotion along any one of these factors independ-
ently. 
Subsequently, Nowlis (1965) reviewed 15 factor 
analytic studies of mood and found six unipolar factors 
which emerged in nearly every study. He considered these 
"sure'' factors of affect structure. In addition, he found 
that another six unipolar factors emerged with some 
regularity across studies. Accordingly, he thought these 
could be considered ''tentative" independent factors. The 
six primary factors apparent in almost all studies were 
labeled aggression, anxiety, surgency, concentration, 
fatigue, and social affection. 
14 
Following the initial work of Nowlis, Borgatta 
(1961} confirmed the existence of these six "sure'' unipolar 
factors in a self-report study. This study was seen and 
used as a validation of the earlier work done by Nowlis and 
it included the same response format proposed by Nowlis and 
his associates (Green & Nowlis, 1957; Nowlis & Nowlis, 
1956). The response format consisted of a four point 
rating scale after each term (see Table 1). Subjects 
indicated one of the three options to denote how the affect 
term best described their current mood, or they indicated 
"?" which meant that they could not decide, or that the 
term did not apply to the way they were feeling. The use 
of this format becomes an important issue in determining 
factor structure and will be discussed more fully below. 
It is worth noting that in four of the six factors 
extracted by Borgatta, there were terms that loaded 
oppositely on the factor. This bipolarity was disregarded 
however, because these loadings were not as high (though in 
the .5 range} as were the loadings for terms that Borgatta 
subsequently used to develop factor scales. 
During the 1960's Lorr and McNair began developing 
and validating their Profile Of Moods States (Lorr, Datson 
15 
Table 1. The different response formats used by research-
er's studying self-reported affect. 
----------------------------------------------------------
Response format proposed by Nowlis (1965) 
Response Interpretation Score 
vv I definitely feel ..... 4 points 
v I feel slightly ....... 3 points 
? I cannot decide ....... 2 points 
or term does not apply ... 
no I am definitely not ... 1 point 
Response format proposed by McNair & Lorr (1964) 
Response Interpretation Score 
extremely I feel extremely....... 3 points 
quite a bit I feel quite a bit..... 2 points 
a little I feel a little........ 1 point 
not at all I don't feel at all.... 0 points 
(The response "moderately" was also included in their later 
studies and was given the score of 2 points while the 
response "quite a bit" was scored 3 points and "extremely" 
was scored 4 points.) 
Response format proposed by Meddis (1972) 
Response Interpretation Score 
vv I definitely feel . ......... 4 points 
v I feel slightly ............ 3 points 
X I do not feel .............. 2 points 
XX I definitely do not feel ... 1 point 
16 
& Smith, 1967; Lorr, McNair, Weinstein, Michaux & Raskin, 
1961; McNair & Lorr, 1964; McNair, Lorr & Droppleman, 1971; 
POMS - originally called the Psychiatric Outpatient Mood 
scales). These researchers initially found six replicable 
unipolar mood factors: tension, anxiety, anger, depression, 
vigor, and fatigue; and later found evidence for two 
additional unipolar factors: friendliness and confusion. 
These factors, taken together, include the dimensions 
proposed by Nowlis (Nowlis and Nowlis, 1956) and later 
confirmed by Borgatta (1961). 
The final version of the POMS had factorial derived, 
unipolar scales measuring tension, anger-hostility, 
fatigue, depression, confusion, friendliness, elation, and 
vigor. The response format used by Lorr and his colleagues 
(see Table 1) was different from that used by Nowlis and by 
Borgatta in that it did not have the "?'' response option. 
However, as will be discussed below, this response format 
also "pulls" for the extraction of unipolar rather than 
bipolar factors. 
Thayer (1967), using arousal theory as his theoretical 
base (see Duffy, 1962; Malmo, 1959), set out to measure 
what he considered to be a large, bipolar, emotional factor 
of activation. Employing the same response format as 
Nowlis (1965), he found that rather than one large bipolar 
dimension, four predominantly unipolar factors emerged in 
his orthogonal rotation. He termed the four factors as 
17 
follows: 1) General Activation, which is comprised of the 
terms full-of-pep, active, vigorous, energetic, lively, 
peppy and activated; 2) Deactivation-Sleep, which is 
comprised of the terms drowsy, sleepy, tired, wide-awake 
(recoded), and wakeful (recoded); 3) High Activation, 
which is comprised of the terms tense, jittery, stirred-up, 
clutched-up, intense, anxious, and fearful; and 4) General 
Deactivation, which is comprised of the terms placid, 
leisurely, at-rest, quiescent, calm, still, and quiet. 
Again it seemed that common-sense notions of affect 
were incorrect. Factor analysis had shown over the course 
of a decade of research that happiness was not the opposite 
of sadness, anger-hostility was not the opposite of 
friendliness, and a state of arousal was not the opposite 
of a state of sleepiness. Rather, it appeared that the 
evidence was consistently in favor of a large number of 
discrete emotional states which could vary independently of 
each other. 
In 1969, Bradburn published his monograph The Struc-
ture of Psychological Well-Being. In both his pilot work 
and in his nationwide, cross-sectional sample of respon-
dents, he discovered that two dimensions of affect, 
positive affect and negative affect, were uncorrelated with 
each other, and that each dimension correlated indepen-
dently with other indices of well-being. Both measures 
were unipolar scales, in the tradition of previous research 
18 
(see Appendix A for a complete list of the questions that 
make up each scale). Commenting on the observed indepen-
dence of these two scales, Bradburn said: 
within a given period of time, such as a week or two, 
one may experience many different emotions, both 
positive and negative, and that in general there is no 
tendency for the two types to be experienced in any 
particular relation to one another. This lack of 
correlation means that information about the extent of 
positive feelings a person has experienced in the 
recent past does not give us any information on the 
extent of his negative feelings (1969, p.225). 
It was found that negative affect correlated 
positively with indices of the number of things people 
worried about, the intensity with which people worried 
about these things, the number of physical symptoms 
reported in the past few weeks, psychological anxiety, and 
whether or not the respondent had worried about having a 
"nervous breakdown". Positive affect was uncorrelated with 
these measures but was positively correlated to indices of 
sociability and experiences of novelty. It was interesting 
that the only demographic index that correlated to any 
degree with these scales was Socio-Economic Status (SES) 
which had a slight correlation with positive affect. 
Bradburn contended that SES was related to positive affect 
by the fact that people with a higher SES live in a "social 
opportunity structure ... {which) would facilitate their 
having the kinds of experiences that are associated with 
higher positive affect (1969, p. 227)." As indicated 
above, Bradburn's analyses found that negative affect was 
uncorrelated with the indices that correlated to positive 
affect, and positive affect was independent from negative 
affect and the indices which correlated with negative 
affect. 
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It was further found that the best index of 
psychological well-being came through the subtraction of 
negative affect from positive affect. Bradburn termed this 
index the Affect Balance Scale and it indicated that well-
being was the degree to which positive affective feelings 
surpassed negative affective feelings over time. 
Bradburn's work was significant for several 
reasons. First, this was the initial work to measure 
affect on a nationwide scale, rather than with a relatively 
small sample of students or patients. Second, he clarified 
that these two dimensions had differential and independent 
relations with other life experiences. Third, even though 
his analysis used two independent scales which sound 
deceptively similar to Watson's proposed bipolar dimensions 
(Watson & Tellegen, 1985}, they were unipolar scales and 
were seen as further support for the validity of all 
unipolar factors of emotions. 
There is an important issue that needs to be 
focused further at this point. There is a difference 
between a small number of broad factors varying independ-
ently and a large number of discrete factors varying inde-
pendently. Bradburn found support for the former (two 
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factors: positive and negative affect, which are independ-
ent of each other over time). Unfortunately, however, 
because he used unipolar scales, because of the scientific 
zeitgeist of the time, and because semantically (or by 
common sense) positive affect should be the opposite of 
negative affect and this was found not to be the case, his 
work could easily be seen as further support for the latter 
(i.e., a large number of unipolar scales that operated 
independently). Bradburn had begun to clarify affective 
structure by discovering the independent correlates of his 
two scales, but had also clouded research by unintention-
ally fostering the impression that all emotional factors 
were unipolar. As will be seen later, continued support 
has been found for the independence of two broad factors of 
affect; but this result has not been found for discrete 
unipolar factors. Instead, these factors have tended to 
converge into a smaller number of broad bipolar factors. 
Returning to analyses of discrete emotions, 
Hendrick and Lilly (1970) attempted to validate the six 
"sure" and six "tentative" monopolar factors found earlier 
by Nowlis (1965). In addition, they made the first attempt 
to replicate factors under two different conditions: a 
normal wakefulness and a sleep deprived condition. They 
reported only fair factor congruence between the two 
conditions. This was not unexpected, given that the 
structure they attempted to replicate was composed of a 
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large number of narrowly defined factors. Additionally, it 
was very likely that they employed an unstable correlation 
matrix for the factor analysis of the sleep deprived group, 
as there were only 62 subjects under this condition and 
they were assessing the intercorrelations among 44 terms. 
More pertinent to the present discussion, was the 
fact that Hendrick and Lilly attempted to directly compare 
two different response formats in their control condition. 
For 126 subjects they used the format developed by Nowlis 
(see Table 1) and for 135 subjects they used their own 
format which consisted of a nine point rating scale placed 
below each emotion term and anchored by "very much" on one 
end and "not at all" on the other end. These authors 
extracted 10 factors under each response format, eight of 
which they considered interpretable. They considered all 
factors to be unipolar, except for a fatigue-activation 
bipolar factor (their fourth factor). This interpretation 
was retained even though their first two factors both have 
items that loaded oppositely on the factor in the .5 range. 
Given the number of subjects that were used, a loading of 
.5 was likely a significant loading, however they provided 
no indication that this was the case. 
When comparing response formats, they reported 
factor congruence coefficients ranging from .65 to .96 (p. 
456) across factors under each condition. To assess their 
results, they used a "general rule of thumb" which was that 
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coefficients above .75 reflected a "good fit". They 
contended that their findings demonstrated "a high degree 
of congruence between the two types of scales in the factor 
structure that emerged. Such results provide(d) evidence 
for the generality of the factor structures across variat-
ion in scale type (p. 456)". The observed similarity 
across response styles may reflect one of two possibil-
ities. First, their response format was not well described 
and it may have been a continuum rating, like the one used 
by Lorr and McNair (see Table 1). If this was the case, a 
large number of monopolar factors would still be expected, 
and they would not be expected to differ much from the 
factors observed under the Nowlis format (within the 
constraints of the adjective sampling pool, of course). A 
second possibility was that the congruence coefficients, of 
which Hendrick and Lilly state not much was known, give an 
overly generous estimate of factor congruence. In either 
case, this was the last time in the reported literature 
that response style has not greatly affected the outcome of 
factor analytic solutions to self-reported mood. 
It is important to note that at this point it was 
an established "fact" that emotional experience was 
comprised of discrete, unipolar factors. This seemed to be 
true regardless of the response format that was used to 
assess mood. Many theories of discrete emotions developed 
from this climate (i.e. Ekman, 1972; Izard, 1972, 1977; 
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plutchik, 1962, 1980), and it is not the purpose of this 
study to detract from these theories, as they do have 
viability. Rather, this is pointed out because after this 
point in the history of emotional research, response format 
began to become a more important determinant of factor 
structure. 
Meddis (1972) began to examine the influence of 
response format on the factor structure of self-rated mood 
when he was working on his doctoral dissertation and 
repeatedly failed to find results that were similar to 
previous research. Meddis realized that he was using a 
symmetrical response format (see Table 1), where there are 
as many categories for rejection as there are for accept-
ance, while others were not. He noted of the Nowlis 
response format two problems: 
firstly, the query category will present scoring 
difficulties. If we give one point to 'no', two points 
to'?', three points to 'v', etc., we have the problem 
of justifying the scale as ordinal ... Secondly, the 
scale is not symmetrical; we have two categories of 
acceptance but only one category of rejection (p. 180). 
The latter criticism of asymmetry can be applied equally 
well to the response format of Lorr and McNair, and. 
probably to that of Hendrick and Lilly. 
In assessing the effect of a symmetrical response 
format compared to the format of Nowlis, Meddis carried out 
three analyses. In the first analysis, he discovered that 
the Nowlis format resulted in more nonsignificant correlat-
ions among terms, and that it selectively depressed 
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negative correlations. Thus, the Nowlis format inappropri-
atelY gave the impression that adjectives which were 
broadly opposite in meaning did not correlate negatively 
with each other. 
In his second analysis, Meddis factor analyzed 
(principal components with a Varimax rotation) terms very 
similar to those used by Thayer (1967). As mentioned 
above, Thayer was expecting to find a large bipolar factor 
of emotion that followed the hypotheses of arousal theory, 
but instead found four smaller monopolar factors. Using 
the Nowlis format (which Thayer also used), Meddis extract-
ed five almost exclusively monopolar factors, of which the 
first four are equivalent to those discovered by Thayer. 
However, when using his own response format, Meddis 
extracted two large bipolar factors and a smaller unipolar 
factor. The first two factors under this format were in 
fact a bipolar combination of Thayer's earlier factors. 
Thayer's factors of 'General Activation' and 'Deactivation 
Sleep' merged to form a single bipolar factor. Similarly, 
the originally monopolar factors of 'High Activation' and 
'General Deactivation' merged to form a large bipolar 
factor. These large bipolar factors (see Table 2) show a 
strong similarity to the factors of Positive Affect and 
Negative Affect proposed by Watson and Tellegen (1985) to 
be the major dimensions of affective structure (compare 
Table 2 with Figure 1). 
Table 2. The first two factors found by Meddis in the 
reanalysis of Thayer's hypotheses. Taken from Meddis 
(1972). 
Factor 1 
alert 
sleepy 
lively 
wide-awake 
drowsy 
concentrating 
tired 
active 
vigorous 
sluggish 
warm-hearted 
.83 
-.74 
.71 
.71 
-.70 
.68 
-.66 
.59 
.53 
-.51 
.51 
Factor 2 
leisurely 
carefree 
nonchalant 
jittery 
calm 
clutched-up 
25 
.72 
.65 
.62 
-.60 
.56 
-.53 
26 
In his final analysis, Meddis reanalyzed the 
hypotheses of Green and Nowlis (1967). It may be recalled 
that Green and Nowlis originally hypothesized four bipolar 
factors, and were surprised when instead they found a 
larger number of predominantly unipolar factors. Using a 
symmetrical response format, Meddis again found bipolar 
factors emerged from the data, while under the Nowlis 
format unipolar factors emerged. 
Spurred on by the work of Meddis, a number of 
researchers that had previously found factor analytic 
support for unipolar emotional factors have reanalyzed 
their own measures. Thayer (1978) found that when he did 
not impose an orthogonal solution on his data, his four 
monopolar factors formed two negatively correlated factors 
in an oblique rotation. Like Meddis (1972), Thayer found 
that 'High Activation' and 'General Deactivation' cor-
related negatively, as did 'General Activation' and 
'Deactivation-Sleep'. In addition, these two pairs of 
factors each formed a distinct bipolar factor in a second 
order factor analysis. Though this result was not due to 
response format, it does support a model of affect, like 
that presented in Figure 1, that is characterized by fewer, 
more robust factors. 
Lorr and his colleagues (Lorr, McNair & Fisher, 
1982; Lorr & Shea, 1979) have also reanalyzed the factor 
structure in their Profile of Mood States (McNair, Lorr & 
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oroppleman, 1971; POMS). As mentioned previously, this is 
a frequently used measure of affective experience that 
yields scores on eight monopolar scales. Their original 
response format, while not including the '?' option used by 
Nowlis, was asymmetrical (see Table 1). When they used a 
balanced response format (Lorr & Shea, 1979) or when they 
partialed out response bias (Lorr, McNair & Fisher, 1982), 
a smaller number of more robust and predominantly bipolar 
factors emerged. In each instance the largest factors were 
bipolar, while some of the smaller factors were monopolar. 
The authors do not comment on what this fact may imply for 
their published questionnaire (POMS), but it is clear that 
a biased response format will contaminate a factor struct-
ure that is broad and bipolar. 
Russell (1979) has also tested some of Meddis' 
hypotheses. He found, in a comparison of the Nowlis 
(1965), McNair and Lorr (1964), Meddis (1972), and a true-
false response format, that the Meddis format was least 
subject to the effects of response bias. 
Current Two-Factor Models 
3. A. Russell is an often cited and fairly prolific 
researcher of affective structure. Since his theory of 
affective structure has changed over time, an overview of 
his work will be presented. Additionally, critical 
comments will be made where they are appropriate to the 
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goals of the present research. His first work on affect 
was done in collaboration with Albert Mehrabian (Mehrabian 
& Russell, 1974) and resulted in a book that was based on a 
series of studies of affective experience. Their theoret-
ical starting point was to apply the dimensions found with 
Osgood's (1966) semantic differential to emotional experi-
ence. They believed that three dimensions (pleasantness-
unpleasantness, arousal-sleepiness, and dominance-submiss-
iveness) would be found in research on affect, and that 
these dimensions would be analogous to the dimensions of 
evaluation, activity, and potency, which had been found in 
a wide variety of studies which employed the semantic 
differential (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957; Snider & 
Osgood, 1969). 
In their first work (1974), factor analytic scales 
that directly corresponded to their three proposed factors 
were developed. Later (Russell & Mehrabian, 1977), they 
reported that their previously developed scales of pleas-
antness, arousal, and dominance accounted for almost all of 
the replicable variance in 42 scales of emotion developed 
by other authors (e.g. Izard, 1972; Johnson & Myers, 1967; 
McNair & Lorr, 1964; Nowlis, 1965; Spielberger, Gorsuch & 
Lushene, 1970; Thayer, 1967; Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965). In 
addition, they presented beta weights which showed how each 
of the other 42 scales could be predicted solely from their 
three dimensions, and a measure of acquiescence response 
bias. 
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Clearly, it would be an impressive finding if a11 
published measures of emotion could be adequately predicted 
by just three scales. However, a close examination of the 
process they followed in scale construction leaves quest-
ions over the claimed superiority of their dimensions. To 
develop their emotion scales (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974), 
they had students rate story vignettes for emotional 
quality. There is no problem with this procedure in 
itself; however, the scales which ratings were made upon 
were developed on primarily a priori grounds, rather than 
from experimental evidence. Since they hypothesized three 
dimensions upon which emotion should vary, they proceeded 
to list pairs of terms that they believed would be con-
trasts along the dimension of interest. For example, one 
item on the Pleasure scale is anchored by "happy" on the 
left, followed by a line with nine spots where a subject 
can make a check mark and then anchored on the right by 
"unhappy". In the final form of their measure there were 
six similar item pairs for each of the three dimensions of 
pleasure, arousal and dominance. For each story vignette 
subjects were requested to mark how they felt along the 
continuum between the two anchor terms. Scores along these 
continua were then factored by means of a principal 
components analysis. 
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There would not be a problem with this procedure if 
the item pairs were derived through factor analysis or even 
by means of intercorrelations from a separate sample. 
However, the item pairs were not, and the authors' present-
ed no evidence which demonstrated that their item pairs 
actually fall at opposite ends of an emotional continuum. 
The confused nature of this process is apparent when we see 
that as part of the Pleasure scale the word pair "relaxed 
vs. bored" appears. However, as part of the Arousal scale, 
the word pair "relaxed vs. stimulated" appears (p. 216). 
Is "relaxed" a marker of Pleasure or a marker of Arousal? 
Other questionable word pairs which they believed repre-
sented a continuum were "contented vs. melancholic" 
(Pleasure scale), "jittery vs. dull" (Arousal scale), "in 
control vs. cared for", and "important vs. awed" (both on 
the Dominance scale). The supposed continua between these 
word pairs are not readily evident. Further, the haphazard 
pairing of words which anchor their continua throws doubt 
on the validity of the entire measure. 
In a later study, Russell (1978) employed the above 
scales and reconfirmed the importance of Pleasure and 
Arousal as dimensions of affect. In this study he did not 
find further support for the dimension of Dominance. 
However, a number of years later (Russell & Steiger, 1982) 
he again reasserted the importance of this scale. In the 
1978 study, he had subjects rate emotional terms on the 
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semantic differential-like scales described above. Then, 
by means of a multidimensional scaling technique, extracted 
three dimensions along which all terms varied. These 
dimensions were his original three hypothesized dimensions. 
He then compared the scaling dimensions from his study to 
the scaling dimensions found by Bush (1972, 1973} and the 
three semantic differential dimensions found by Averill 
(1975) in their studies of mood term similarities. Compar-
isons were made by canonical correlations and the results 
showed strong support for the dimensions of pleasure and 
arousal across studies, but there was no clear convergence 
for the third dimension. In this same study Russell 
reported the results of a principal components analysis 
done on 11 scales (not items} that were shared across 
studies. This analysis resulted in a two-dimensional 
solution. The two dimensions, consistent with the canoni-
cal correlations, were interpreted as Pleasure and Arousal. 
The last analysis is discussed because it is easy 
to get the impression from reading Russell's abstracts, 
summaries or discussions that he has performed a number of 
factor analytic studies on emotional terms (Mehrabian & 
Russell, 1974; Russell, 1978, 1979, 1980). However, there 
is only one analysis, within one larger study, where factor 
analytic results for individual terms are reported. In all 
other cases his reported results are on the factoring of a 
number of scales, rather than items. In the one case where 
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a principal components analysis was conducted on individual 
items, Russell and Ridgeway (1983) presented the results of 
an analysis conducted on self-reported affect in two 
samples of children. Initially, for each sample a large 
factor upon which all items loaded was removed from the 
analysis. This factor was considered a response bias 
factor, and was thrown out. However, no evidence was 
presented to indicate that this was the only meaningful 
interpretation for this factor. After the first factor was 
disposed of, it was found in the first sample of children 
that none of the emotion terms adequately described the 
second factor. Nevertheless, this factor was retained on a 
Qriori grounds, and was later discussed as if it lent 
experimental support for their two-factor (Arousal and 
Domminance) model of affect. In their second sample of 
children, terms did load on the second factor of their 
extraction. However, the argument that the dominant 
dimensions of affect in a principal components analysis of 
self-reported mood were Pleasantness and Arousal was not 
entirely convincing. 
In sum, Russell's methodology, seen in both his 
original analyses with Mehrabian and in his later work with 
Ridgeway, appears to be on shaky ground and calls into 
question the interpretations that he makes regarding the 
nature of affective structure. 
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This extended discussion and critique of Russell's 
work has been done primarily because his two-dimensional 
structure is in contrast to that of Watson and his col-
leagues (Watson & Clark, 1984; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 
1984; Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Zevon & Tellegen, 1982). 
These latter researchers present considerable evidence that 
the main dimensions of affective structure within a two-
dimensional model are in fact at a 45 degree rotation to 
the dimensions proposed by Russell. It may be that both 
models are valid, but alternative, two-factor solutions to 
the same pattern of correlations among emotional terms; as 
Russell primarily uses scaling techniques (as have other 
researchers on the dimensions of vocal and facial express-
ion) while Watson and his colleagues rely on the first two 
main dimensions that emerge from factor analysis (rotated 
to orthogonal simple structure). However, Russell's 
dimensions may differ from those found by Watson and 
Tellegen, at least in part, because of the methodological 
questions raised above. 
In either case, Watson and Tellegen (1985) contend 
that Russell's dimensions will emerge as the first two 
factors in an unrotated principal components analysis of 
self-rated mood. Alternatively, Russell's dimensions may 
be seen in a two-factor, orthogonal factor analysis of 
emotion items by noting the terms that load highly on both 
Positive and Negative Affect. These are the terms which 
!' 
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fall on the diagonals in Figure 1. It is interesting to 
note that a similar controversy regarding the appropriate 
rotation of factors in a two-factor space has emerged in 
the field of personality (which we will discuss more fully 
later). Briefly, Gray (1981) has argued that the dominant 
dimensions of personality are impulsivity and anxiety. He 
believes that these dimensions lie at a 45 or 47 degree 
rotation to Eysenck's (1981; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985) well 
documented dimensions of introversion-extraversion and 
neuroticism-stability. The debate over proper rotational 
solutions in either one of these areas will not be settled 
(or even addressed directly) by this study, but the 
similarity of arguments is apparent. 
We will turn now to a more detailed discussion of 
the dimensions of Positive and Negative Affect as put forth 
by Watson and Tellegen (1985). These authors, building on 
earlier work (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1984; Zevon & 
Tellegen, 1982) that utilized both intraindividual P-type 
factor analysis (Cattell, 1952) and traditional across 
subject R-type factor analysis, put forth the model 
depicted in Figure 1. 
In support of this structure, six of the previously 
published studies that had argued for a large number of 
discrete emotional factors (Borgatta, 1961; Hendrick & 
Lilly, 1970; Lebo & Nesselroade, 1978; McNair et al., 1971; 
Russell & Ridgeway, 1983; Thayer, 1967) were reanalyzed. 
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It was the contention of Watson and Tellegen (1985) that 
there were several reasons for confusion over the basic 
factors of emotional experience. They stated: 
many self-report studies have a number of methodolo-
gical problems and biases including poor sampling of 
affect terms, improper response formats, and acquies-
cence response bias that attenuate the normally high 
negative correlations between opposite mood terms, and 
so preclude the emergence of large bipolar dimensions 
.... our analyses bear out the critical importance of 
an additional factor for understanding study outcomes, 
namely the chosen method of analysis. Investigators of 
self-rated mood have generally used factor analysis and 
have used ... (the] Kaiser criterion (which retains all 
principal components with eigenvalues of 1.00 or 
greater) (and] tends to result in the extraction of a 
relatively large number of factors, especially when the 
number of variables is large .... In contrast, our own 
analyses of self-rated mood ... have been geared ... to 
clarify dominant dimensions. In factor analysis these 
are identifiable by the clear and discontinuous sali-
ence of the first few principal components or factors 
relative to the subsequent ones (p. 220). 
The last issue raised in this quote, that of the proper 
criteria for factor extraction, was seen by Watson and 
Tellegen as the primary reason that the broad structure of 
affect had been overlooked for so long. 
In the six studies that were reanalyzed, Watson and 
Tellegen first reconstructed an approximation to the 
original correlational matrix of items (in addition, they 
used data from three of their own studies). Each matrix 
was then subjected to a principal factor analysis (or 
Principal Axis factoring in SPSSX language). Upon assess-
ing the percentage of common variance that was accounted 
for by each factor, it became clear that there was a marked 
''elbow" at the third factor in each solution. Since they 
36 
were assessing the dominant dimensions of affect, the 
traditional Kaiser criterion was not employed and two 
factors {the two above the "elbow" in the plot of the 
variance accounted for) were extracted from each solution 
and rotated to orthogonal simple structure by the Varimax 
procedure. In every solution the first two factors 
accounted for between one half to three quarters of the 
common variance. Upon both a visual comparison across 
factor solutions, and a quantitative analysis of factor 
convergence, it was concluded that Positive and Negative 
Affect were the dimensions being tapped in every case. 
There were 36 factor convergence correlations between 
Positive Affect factors across the studies {i.e., the 
Positive Affect factors from each of the nine studies was 
paired with the Positive Affect factors across the other 
eight studies). Out of these 36 congruence coefficients, 
29 were above .90 and only one was below .80. Negative 
Affect fared less well, though still showing clear converg-
ence. Of the 36 intercorrelations, 19 were above .90 and 
four were below .80. With these results it could be seen 
that despite the confusion and disagreement between studies 
which assessed affect at the discrete, many-factor level, 
there was a clear convergence across the reanalyzed studies 
at the broad, two-factor level of analysis. 
Based on the overall average loading for each of 
the terms analyzed, Watson and Tellegen selected the terms 
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presented in Figure 1 as those that most clearly define 
each of the four dimensions of affect (Positive Affect, 
Negative Affect, degree of Pleasure, and degree of Engage-
ment) which can be represented in this two-factor space. 
This positioning was accomplished by assigning "each term 
to that region in which it fell in the majority of the 
solutions in which it occurred" (p. 230; italics are 
added). 
Additional reanalyses were then conducted by Watson 
and Tellegen (1985) on the oblique, many-factorial solu-
tions originally found by several researchers (Lebo & 
Nesselroade, 1978; McNair et al., 1971; Zevon & Tellegen, 
1982). For each of these studies a second order factor 
analysis was completed using the procedure developed by 
Hendrickson and White (1966). In each case, two second 
order factors were extracted and rotated to orthogonal 
structure. The terms that defined these second order 
factors indicated they were clearly Positive and Negative 
Affect dimensions. The second order dimensions from each 
study were then compared to the two dimensional reanalyzed 
solutions. In every case the factors between each solution 
correlated between .920 and .999, which indicated quantita-
tively that Positive Affect and Negative Affect were clear-
ly the dimensions emerging in each solution. Finally, the 
ten oblique factor scales from a study (Kotsch, Gerbing, & 
Schwartz, 1982) employing Izard's Differential Emotions 
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scale for Children (Izard, 1979: DES-III) were subjected to 
a similar second order factor analysis. Positive and 
Negative Affect dimensions were again readily apparent, 
despite the fact that disengaged states are not included on 
the DES-III (i.e., terms reflecting fatigue and relaxation 
which are considered excellent markers of low Positive 
Affect and low Negative Affect, respectively). Izard's 
factor of Interest loaded highly on only the Positive 
Affect factor. "Enjoyment" loaded highly and positively on 
Positive Affect and moderately but negatively on Negative 
Affect. "Surprise" loaded positively on both factors. 
"Sadness" loaded negatively on Positive Affect and posi-
tively on Negative Affect. The factors of "Anger", 
"Disgust", "Contempt", "Fear", "Shame", and "Guilt" all 
loaded on Negative Affect but not significantly on Positive 
Affect. These results are again consistent with the 
placement of terms in Figure 1. 
In describing the nature of Positive and Negative 
Affect, Watson and Tellegen (1985) note that these factors 
are descriptively bipolar but affectively, or experien-
tially, they are unipolar dimensions. This definition 
emphasizes that it is only the high end of each dimension 
which represents a state of emotional arousal (high 
affective experience), while the low end of each dimension 
reflects a "relative absence of affective involvement•• (p. 
221). Positive Affect (PA) is described (Watson & Clark, 
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1984) as reflecting the extent to which a person is feeling 
a zest for life or feeling up versus down. High PA is 
reflective of states of excitement, enthusiasm and activi-
ty, while low PA is seen by these authors as reflecting 
states of fatigue and sleepiness. On the other hand, 
Negative Affect (NA) represents the degree to which a 
person feels upset or unpleasantly aroused versus peaceful 
(e.g. distressed, hostile and nervous on the high end 
versus calm and relaxed on the low end). 
Watson and Tellegen (1985) contend that since 
Positive and Negative Affect represent the basic structure 
of affect, states of pleasure and displeasure can be more 
reliably interpreted as combined states of the independent 
dimensions of PA and NA. Pleasure and contentment are 
states that reflect a mix of high PA and low NA, whereas 
states of sadness and unhappiness are combinations of high 
NA and low PA. 
The relationship of pleasantness and unpleasantness 
to PA and NA has produced some continued confusion in 
analyzing affect structure. The confusion referred to is 
primarily one of semantics. Many researchers describe the 
affect terms they investigate as ''positive" affect and 
"negative'' affect (e.g. Diener & Emmons, 1984; Diener & 
Iran-Nejad, 1986; Diener, Larson, Levine, & Emmons, 1985; 
Emmons & Diener, 1986; Larson & Diener, 1985). However, 
Diener and his colleagues have consistently studied terms 
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like happy and contented as "positive" affect items, and 
terms like unhappy and unpleasant as markers of "negative" 
affect. It is easy to see how this could happen because 
"pleasantness" is easily seen as a "positive" affect and 
"unpleasantness" is easily seen as a "negative" affect. 
However, studies that assess what are true Pleasantness and 
Unpleasantness factors (as outlined by Watson and Tellegen) 
will not find the same factor independence or factor 
properties that have been found with the factors of PA and 
NA. By looking at Figure 1 it can be seen that Pleasant-
ness and Unpleasantness should be opposite ends of the same 
continuum, and not independent of each other, as they 
represent a mix of PA and NA. As such, the continued use 
of the same terms ("positive" affect, "negative" affect) to· 
describe different process (Pleasantness, Unpleasantness) 
across studies, will unnecessarily continue to confuse this 
area of the literature. 
Using the structure of affect developed by Tellegen 
and described above, Watson and Clark (1984) conducted a 
massive review of the constructs in the literature which 
assessed the trait they describe as Negative Affectivity 
(unfortunately, the same systematic review of Positive 
Affect constructs has yet to be conducted). A full presen-
tation of the work done by Watson and Clark is beyond the 
scope of the present review. However, key findings from 
this review will be presented. 
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Describing their "trait" construct of Negative 
Affectivity, which runs along the same dimension as their 
"state" concept of Negative Affect, they report: 
Taken together, the data reveal a dimension of stable 
and pervasive individual differences in mood and self-
concept. High-NA individuals are more likely to report 
distress, discomfort, and dissatisfaction over time and 
regardless of the situation, even in the absence of any 
overt or objective source of stress. As a result, 
trait NA scales have a consistently strong relation 
with state measures of anxiety and general negative 
affect, even when the state scales are completed after 
a lapse of several years. High-NA subjects are more 
introspective and honest with themselves, dwelling 
particularly on their failures and shortcomings. They 
also tend to focus on the negative side of others and 
the world in general. Consequently, they have a less 
favorable view of self and other people and are less 
satisfied with themselves and with life (p.483). 
They then provide the further description of individuals 
who are low on the trait of Negative Affectivity: 
They are more content and satisfied with life and 
eschew the ruthless honesty of high-NA individuals, 
both with regard to self and others, in favor of 
smoothing over life's rocky road. They focus on 
themselves less and, when they do, are more pleased 
with what they find, enabling them to maintain a 
better mood, a more favorable self-view, perhaps to 
the point of glossing over (repressing?) some harsh 
truths. Similarly, they have a more positive view 
of others and, in the interest of smooth social 
intercourse, are more conforming and conventional 
(p. 484). 
As evidence of this construct, Watson and Clark 
have analyzed the intercorrelations between a large number 
of published scales from the field of psychological 
assessment. They note, as did Millon (see the Intro-
duction), that each of these assessment measures have 
dissimilar names and have distinct literatures built up 
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around them, yet they are describing the same aspects of 
people. Watson and Clark contend that all these measures 
intercorrelate so highly that they must be seen as mani-
festations of the same underlying construct. Table 3 shows 
the intercorrelations they obtained between the 12 most 
highly convergent measures of the 18 measures they review-
ed. As can be seen from the table, measures of anxiety.and 
neuroticism lie at the high end of this dimension and 
contrast strongly with measures of social desirability and 
repression, which are at the low end of this dimension. To 
obtain this index of convergence, Watson and Clark combed 
the literature and averaged the intercorrelations observed 
between the various measures in the table. As mentioned 
above, they considered these 12 measures, based on their 
interrelationship, to be basically alternate measures of 
the same construct. 
After presenting the above evidence which showed 
how well these constructs converge, the authors cited both 
reliability and validity data for their construct of 
Negative Affectivity. The validity data confirmed the 
summary descriptions quoted above, while the reliability 
data indicated that the trait of Negative Affectivity 
remains stable for about six months (~'s between .80 and 
.86), after which there is drop off in reliability. 
However, even after one to two years the coefficients 
remain at approximately .60. 
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Table 3 
Intercorrelations between the 12 measures that best define Negative Affec-
tivity (Fran Watson & Clark, 1984}. 
Scale 
1. '.IMAS 
2. A 
3. PT 
4. SD 
5. R-S 
6. ER-Q 
7. Sc 
8. Pn 
9. A-Trait 
10. EPI-N 
11. MPI-N 
12. IPAT 
1 
82a 
85 
88 
-81 
88 
73 
71 
73 
72 
72 
74 
2 
aab 
87 
-86 
87 
77 
72 
81 
44 
3 
ega 
-81 
74 
-88 
82 
74 
81 
62 
44 
4 
a1a 
-88 
87 
-78 
-76 
-60 
5 
76 
75 
80 
81 
75 
76 
Scale 
6 7 8 
42 
9 
goa 
73 
76 
10 11 12 
82C 
71 
76 
Note. Decimals have been anitted. '!MAS =Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale 
(Taylor, 1953}; A =Anxiety (Welsh, 1956, 1965}; Pt = Psychasthenia 
(McKinley & Hathaway, 1942}; SD = Social Desirability (Edwards, 1957}; R-S = 
Repression-Sensitization (Byrne, 1961 ; Byrne, Barry, & Nel~, 1963} ; ER-o = 
Ego Resiliency-obvious (Block, 1965}; Sc = Schizophrenia (Hathaway, 1956}; 
Pn = Psychoneurosis (Block, cited in Dahlstran, Welsh, & Dahlstran, 1975}; 
A-Trait = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory A-Trait Scale (Spielberger et al. , 
1970}; EPI-N = Eysenck Personality Inventory Neuroticism Scale (Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1968}; MPI-N Maudsley Personality Inventory Neuroticism Scale 
(Eysenck, 1962}; IPAT = IPAT Anxiety Scale (Krug, Scheier, & cattell, 1976}. 
Clcoefficient alP'la or Kuder-Richardson estimate of internal consistency. 
bsplit-half reliability. CP-arallel forms reliability. 
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Further indications of Negative Affectivity can be 
seen in a recent study by Tanaka-Matsumi and Kamoeka 
(1986). These authors administered 11 measures of depress-
ion, anxiety and social desirability to almost 400 sub-
jects. The measures that they used were: the Beck Depress-
ion Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 
1961); the Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale (Zung, 1965); 
the Lubin Depression Adjective Checklist - Form B (Lubin, 
1967); the Zung Self-Rating Anxiety Scale (Zung, 1971); the 
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Speilberger, 
Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970); the Taylor Manifest Anxiety 
Scale (Taylor, 1953); the S-R Inventory of Anxiousness 
(Endler, Hunt & Rosenstein, 1962)'; the Edwards Social 
Desirability Scale (Edwards, 1957); and the Marlowe-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). It can 
be seen that many of these scales are the same as those 
assessed by Watson and Clark (1984) and listed in Table 3. 
Paralleling the findings of Watson and Clark, the later 
study found that for all of the anxiety and depression 
measures (except the S-R Inventory of Anxiousness, which 
assesses anxiety in response to 14 specific anxiety 
provoking situations), the convergent correlations between 
similar measures were of the same high magnitude as the 
divergent correlations across measures of anxiety and 
depression. That is, as measurable constructs, depression 
and anxiety were not distinct entities. In addition, the 
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Edwards Social Desirability Scale was found to correlate 
negatively and strongly with all of the anxiety and 
depression measures (r's between -.49 and -.85). This is 
also consistent with the finding of Watson and Clark. 
Additional support for viewing Negative Affectivity 
as a unitary construct comes from a study by Meites, 
Lovallo, & Pishkin (1980). These authors reported that 
measures of anxiety, depression, and neuroticism (using the 
Beck Depression Inventory, the Zung Self-Rating Depression 
Scale, the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale and the Neurot-
icism scale of the Eysenck Personality Inventory [Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1975)) correlated so highly with each other that 
they could not be considered assessments of distinct 
constructs. 
An additional source of evidence for the robust 
nature of Positive and Negative Affect is found in a study 
by Gotlib and Meyer (1986) who conducted a factor analysis 
of the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (Zuckerman & 
Lubin, 1965; MAACL). The MAACL was designed to provide 
valid and differential measurement of anxiety, depression, 
and hostility. However, using 475 students as subjects, it 
was found that two large dimensions emerged in a principal 
components analysis. The first factor defined all of the 
negative affect items while the second factor contained all 
of the positive affect items from the scale. Once again, 
depression, anxiety, and hostility were not differentiated. 
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Watson and Clark (1984) discussed the similarity of 
Negative Affectivity with the work done by Eysenck (e.g. 
1981) on the dimension of Neuroticism. However, they did 
not equate their construct with his, even though neuroti-
cism is one of the best measures of Negative Affectivity. 
watson and Tellegen (1985) also noted the similarity 
between the dimensions of Negative Affect and neuroticism, 
as well as Positive Affect with extraversion. However, 
they did not equate their dimensions with Eysenck's 
dimension. 
As noted in the Introduction, it is the thesis of 
the present study that the same dimensions of human 
experience have been tapped twice - earlier by Eysenck in 
factor analytic studies of personality, and currently by 
Tellegen and his students in factor analytic studies of 
emotions. Consistent with this thesis, Plutchik (1980) has 
cogently argued that emotions, especially one's general 
moods, are nothing distinct from that which makes up 
personality. In other words, an individual's personality 
character is indistinguishable from his or her emotional 
character, when they are both assessed over the course of 
time. 
To examine the degree to which Watson and Tellegen 
(1985) and Eysenck (1981) are assessing the same individual 
differences, the results of a number of studies that have 
explored the interface of personality and emotions will be 
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discussed. However, before this is done an overview of 
Eysenck's extensive work on personality will be presented. 
REVIEW OF PERSONALITY DIMENSIONS 
Beginning in the 1950's Eysenck (1952, 1962) set 
out on a long program of research to assess the dominant 
dimensions of personality. He originally identified two 
independent dimensions of personality; one, the continuum 
from introversion to extraversion (E), and the other, the 
continuum from emotional stability to neuroticism (N). 
Later, Eysenck (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) proposed a further 
dimension of personality, psychoticism (P), which was 
thought to reflect a predisposition to experience psychotic 
behavior. Additionally, in the last three versions of 
Eysenck's measure of personality, a fourth scale has been 
used (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968, 1975; Eysenck, Eysenck, & 
Barrett, 1985). The fourth scale was originally intended 
as an indication of dissimulation, hence its designation as 
the lie scale (L). The L scale has subsequently been 
interpreted as another stable dimension of personality (see 
McCrea & Costa, 1985) that apparently reflects a naive view 
of self and of one's interactions with others. There have 
been conflicting reports over what the P scale measures 
(see Claridge, 1981) with many reports indicating that it 
taps a dimension of "toughmindedness" or sociopathic 
tendencies, rather than psychotic behavior. Since the 
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latter two dimensions (P and L) are not of central concern 
here, attention will be focused on the more concise and 
well validated measures of E and N. 
In an extensive review of the relevant literature, 
Eysenck {1970) found support for conceptualizing person-
ality in terms of the two broad dimensions of extraversion 
and emotionality (which is what Eysenck and Eysenck [1975] 
now prefer to call the neuroticism dimension). Support for 
these dimensions dates back to the fourth century B.C. when 
Hippocrates discussed the four basic temperaments. The 
four temperament types - choleric, sanguine, melancholic, 
and phlegmatic - were further described and elaborated upon 
by Galen, Kant, and more recently by Wundt (see Eysenck, 
1970, for a more complete discussion). An examination of 
Figure 2 reveals the connection between the four tempera-
ment types, and the two dimensions of E and N, for which 
extensive factor analytic support has been found (see 
Eysenck, 1981; Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1985). 
In describing the phenotypic expression of these 
dimensions of personality, Eysenck and Eysenck (1975) note: 
The typical extravert is sociable, likes parties, 
has many friends, needs to have people to talk to, and 
does not like reading or studying by himself. He 
craves excitement, takes chances, often sticks his neck 
out, acts on the spur of the moment, and is generally 
an impulsive individual. He is fond of practical 
jokes, always has a ready answer, and generally likes 
change: he is carefree, easy-going, optimistic, and 
likes to 'laugh and be merry.' He prefers to keep 
moving and doing things, tends to be aggressive and 
lose his temper quickly; altogether his feelings are 
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Figure 2. The structure of personality traits shadDJ the dimensions 
of introversion-extraversion (horizontal) arxl neuroticism-stability 
(vertical) arxl their relation to the four personality types proposed by 
Jlippocrates, Galen, arxl Wurxit (see text for JOO:re canplete description). 
FrCJ1l Eysenck arxl Eysenck ( 1975) . 
Anxious 
Rigid 
Sober 
Pessimistic 
Reserved 
Unsociable 
Quiet Melancholic 
~---------------
Passive Phlegmatic 
carefree 
Thoughtful 
Peaceful 
Controlled 
Reliable 
Even-tempered 
calm 
UNSTABLE 
Touchy 
Restless 
Excitable 
Choleric 
Changeable 
Impulsive 
Optimistic 
Active 
------------~EXTRAVER'l'ED 
5anguine Sociable 
OUtgoiDJ 
Talkative 
Responsive 
EasygoiDJ 
Lively 
carefree 
Leadership 
STABLE 
not kept under tight control, and he is not always a 
reliable person. 
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The typical introvert is a quiet, retiring sort of 
person, introspective, fond of books rather than 
people; he is reserved and distant except to intimate 
friends. He tends to plan ahead, 'looks before he 
leaps' and distrusts the impulse of the moment. He 
does not like excitement, takes matters of everyday 
life with proper seriousness, and likes a well ordered 
mode of life. He keeps his feelings under close 
control, seldom behaves in an aggressive manner, and 
does not lose his temper easily. He is reliable, 
somewhat pessimistic, and places great value on ethical 
standards. 
(W)e may describe the typical high N scorer as being 
an anxious, worrying individual, moody and frequently 
depressed. He is likely to sleep badly, and to suffer 
from various psychosomatic disorders. He is overly 
emotional, reacting too strongly to all sorts of 
stimuli, and finds it difficult to get back on an even 
keel after each emotionally arousing experience. His 
strong emotional reactions interfere with his proper 
adjustment, making him react in irrational, sometimes 
rigid ways ... If the high N individual has to be 
described in one word, one m1ght say that he is a 
worrier; his main characteristic is a constant pre-
occupation with things that might go wrong, and a 
strong emotional reaction of anxiety to these thoughts. 
The stable individual, on the other hand, tends to 
respond emotionally only slowly and generally weakly, 
and to return to baseline quickly after emotional 
arousal; he is usually calm, even-tempered, controlled 
and unworried (p. 5). 
Eysenck (1967, 1981) theorizes that the basis for 
the above two dimensions of personality in large part 
resides in individual differences in physiology. According 
to theory, the introversion-extraversion dimension is 
predisposed by differences in the central nervous system 
while the neuroticism-stability dimension is related to 
differences in the lability of the autonomic nervous 
system. Briefly, introverts are seen as having a greater 
resting level of cortical arousal than extroverts. This is 
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due to the greater amount of stimulation that is given to 
the introvert by the reticular arousal system (RAS) of the 
brain stem. The RAS is an evolutionarily primitive compon-
ent of the nervous system and appears to act as a type of 
relay and screening station for a wide assortment of 
internal and external sources of stimulation. Due to the 
already high degree of stimulation received by the intro-
verted person, they tend to shy away from further sources 
of arousal and excitation. Extraverted individuals, on the 
other hand, tend to seek stimulation, variety, and social 
excitation to achieve the same optimum level of cortical 
stimulation as that already had by the introvert. 
It is further theorized that the limbic system or 
"visceral brain", which is the seat of emotional exper-
ience, differs across individuals in its tendency to become 
activated, and is proposed as the basis for the Neuroticism 
dimension of personality. Highly emotional people (ie. 
high N) have a more easily activated limbic system and are 
therefore more emotionally labile than low N people. Low N 
people, on the other hand, are less likely to become 
emotionally engaged across situations and more easily 
return to baseline levels after an emotional arousal. The 
limbic system sits just above the RAS on the brainstem and 
has excitatory neural connections to the RAS. As a result, 
when the limbic system becomes activated the RAS also 
becomes more stimulated and, as a final result, there is a 
52 
further increase in cortical activity. In general then, in 
addition to having greater emotional activation, high N 
individuals respond to stimulation much like introverted 
people because they have greater reticular arousal system 
activation as well. Conversely, low N individuals are less 
likely to become emotionally engaged across a wide range of 
situations and, correspondingly, they will respond to 
stimulation on the basis of where they fall on the E 
dimension of personality. 
Research on these dimensions of personality have 
shown them to be stable traits that remain constant over 
time periods ranging from one to 50 years (Conley, 1985; 
Giuganino & Hindley, 1982; Hindley & Giuganino, 1982; 
Schuerger, Tait, & Tavernelli, 1982). This consistency has 
been observed in self report studies like those listed 
above, and also in ratings done by significant others 
(McCrea, 1982). Additionally, it has been found that the 
factor structure of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire 
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975, EPQ) is equivalent across a 
diverse sample of 26 countries from all parts of the world 
(Barrett & Eysenck, 1984; Eysenck, Barrett, & Eysenck, 
1985; Eysenck, S.B.G. et al., 1986). 
Extensive studies based on these factors of 
personality have been carried out (in 1981 Eysenck reported 
that over 5000 had been done). Across studies significant 
hypothesized differences have been observed in learning and 
memory (Eysenck, M.W., 1981), conditionability (Levey and 
Martin, 1981), pain tolerance (Barnes, 1975), social 
behavior (Wilson, 1981), and in physiology (Gale, 1983; 
Robinson, 1982; Stelmack, 1981). 
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These two factors of personality are incorporated 
into other prominent theories of personality (Guilford, 
1975, cited in Campbell & Reynolds, 1984; McCrea & Costa, 
1985) and emerge as second order factors from the 16 
Personality Factor Questionnaire (Cattell, Eber, & 
Tatsuoka, 1970, 16PF) and the California Personality 
Inventory (see Loehlin, 1985). In a recent factor analysis 
of the scales on the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory 
(Millon, 1982; MCMI), Choca, Peterson, & Shanley (1986) 
found that three factors emerged in a principal components 
analysis. Though interpretation of scales rather than 
items is difficult (especially on the MCMI where an item 
may be on more than one scale), the three factors were 
reasonably interpreted as factors of introversion-extraver-
sion, neuroticism, and psychoticism. 
Perhaps most significantly, the factors of intro-
version-extraversion and emotionality-stability have a 
higher genetic heritability than other personality traits 
(Loehlin, 1985). Almost all adoption, twin, and cross 
generational studies of heredity note that these traits 
have a heritability of about 50 percent (Fulker, 1981; 
Loehlin, 1985; Young, Eaves & Eysenck, 1980). In other 
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words, about half of the phenotypic expression of these 
traits appears to be due to genetic factors (although 
Scarr, Webber, Weinberg, & Wittig, 1981, found heritability 
coefficients to be about 25 percent). It is clear then 
that these dimensions of personality can be considered 
robust, distal variables that fit Buss's (1984) criteria 
for a true within-species individual difference. 
REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND MOOD STUDIES WHICH CONVERGE 
We turn now to a comparison of E and N with PA and 
NA. A visual comparison of Figure 1 with Figure 2, which 
come from two separate bodies of literature separated in 
time by more than ten years, shows a clear similarity among 
constructs. Additionally, a comparison between the verbal 
descriptions given to extraversion and Positive Affect and 
neuroticism and Negative Affect, as elaborated previously, 
reveals a striking similarity between the two models. It 
may also be seen by looking again at Table 3 that neuroti-
cism, as measured by two of Eysenck's early scales of this 
dimension, are considered by Watson and Clark (1984) to be 
excellent measures of their dimension of Negative Affectiv-
ity. Negative Affectivity, it may be recalled, describes 
trait aspects of the mood dimension of Negative Affect. 
Further indications that PA and E and NA and N vary 
together can be seen in the literature of well-being 
(Diener, 1984), in the literature of social cognition where 
studies examining the influence of mood on cognitive 
processing have been conducted, and in a number of less 
easily classified studies. 
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Bradburn (1969) in the U.s., and Harding (1982) in 
Great Britain, report that negative affect, as measured by 
the Bradburn well-being scale (which measures recent 
positive and negative affect, see Appendix A), is higher in 
women than in men; while scores for positive affect are 
equivalent across the sexes. The same phenomenon is found 
with Eysenck's measures, as N is higher in women, while E 
is equal for both sexes (see Eysenck S.B.G., et al., 1986). 
In addition, it may be recalled that when Bradburn (1969) 
first reported his results on psychological well-being, 
positive affect was correlated with sociability and 
experiences of novelty, while negative affect was associ-
ated with the number of worries people had, the intensity 
with which they worried, the number of recent physical 
symptoms they experienced, "psychological anxiety", and 
reported concern over having a nervous breakdown. Given 
the descriptions of E and N above, these are just the types 
of correlates that would be expected if negative affect was 
related to neuroticism and positive affect was related to 
extraversion. 
Following this line of reasoning, researchers 
(Costa & McCrea, 1980, 1984; Warr et al., 1983) have 
assessed the personality dimensions of E and N in relation 
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to measures of emotional and psychological well-being. 
Using the Affect Balance Scale (Bradburn, 1969), they have 
found that extraversion correlates strongly with positive 
affect but not with negative affect, while neuroticism 
correlates strongly with negative affect, but not with 
positive affect. Although Bradburn's measures of positive 
and negative affect are not equivalent to the dimensions of 
Positive and Negative Affect as proposed by Watson and 
Tellegen (1984), they are similar. 
The correlations in these studies have been 
significant but not sufficiently high to warrant consider-
ing the E and PA dimensions and the N and NA dimensions as 
equivalent to each other. However, there are three factors 
which may explain why the correlates were lower than what 
would be expected if the thesis of this study was correct. 
First, the Bradburn measure is only a ten item scale (five 
questions for each type of affect), which may decrease its 
efficacy as a reliable measure. Second, and more impor-
tantly, the items on Bradburn's scales are not "pure" 
markers of PA and NA as but forth by Watson and Tellegen. 
Bradburn's items which assess positive affect are in fact 
combinations of the Watson and Tellegen high PA and 
Pleasantness items. Similarly, Bradburn's negative affect 
items are a combination of high NA and Displeasure items. 
The third factor that may attenuate correlations, is that 
the Bradburn measure asks for positive and negative affect 
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over "the past few weeks". This time frame, while tapping 
general feeling states, may not give as stable an estimate 
of general, or ''trait" mood, as a questionnaire that asked 
specifically for people to report how they "generally" 
feel. 
Neuroticism has been shown to be a significant 
predictor of mood states over time. For example, Williams 
(1981} found that N was more strongly related to subjects' 
average mood over twelve days than to mood on any single 
day. Further, N accounted for 40% of the variance in 
averaged depression states and 36.6% of the variance in 
averaged tension/anxiety states. Overall, subjects with 
high neuroticism scores had poorer mood and showed greater 
variation in mood pattern from one occasion to another, 
than did more stable individuals. 
In line with this research, Hill (1985} used a 
Velten-type depressed mood induction procedure (Velten, 
1968} to assess the influence of mood on personality. In 
the Velten procedure, subjects are given a list of approxi-
mately 50 statements and are asked to read them aloud while 
attempting to enter into the mood created by the state-
ments. In this study all of the mood statements were of a 
depressive nature. Hill found that high N individual were 
more susceptible to the effects of this procedure (i.e. 
they reported greater feelings of depression}. TheE 
dimension was not influenced differentially by this 
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procedure, indicating that those individuals who are high 
in N may be particularly subject to depressed or negative 
mood states and that this is independent from introversion-
extraversion. 
Boyle (1985), using a Velten mood induction 
procedure, assessed the differential effects of mood 
induction between premenstrual and non-premenstrual women. 
Using Izard's Differential Emotions Scale (DES-IV), he 
found that premenstrual women were more susceptible to the 
effects of a depressed mood induction procedure than were 
non-premenstrual women (N=154). The only DES-IV scales 
that significantly differentiated the two groups of women 
were Sadness, Hostility, Fear, and Shame; which were all 
shown above to load on the dimension of Negative Affect in 
a second order factor analysis. 
In the same area of research, and consistent with 
the hypotheses of this study, it was found (Mohan & Chopra, 
1986) that neuroticism scores also increased significantly 
when women were in their premenstrual period as compared to 
their postmenstrual period. 
Isen (1984) has recently reviewed the literature 
dealing with the influence of affect on behavior and 
cognitive processes (i.e. social cognition). She notes 
that there is a difference between the results of studies 
that have induced positive affect and those that have 
induced negative affect. She notes that part of this 
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difference-may be due to subjects resorting to "pleasant-
ness restorative" functions when negative affect is 
induced. That is, attempts at positive affect-like 
behaviors or thoughts are used in order to change the 
induced negative affective state or to eliminate the 
unpleasantness that it brings. Another possibility Isen 
points out, is that there is increasing evidence that the 
assumed symmetry between positive affect and negative 
affect is an illusory result of semantics, and that in 
reality positive and negative affect may be two distinct 
processes. These comments point out that researchers in 
this field have been expecting positive and negative affect 
to be opposite ends of the same continuum, and not making 
use of recent models of affective experience (eg. Bradburn, 
1969; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Despite this, a meaningful 
comparison can still be made between studies of E and N and 
studies that have assessed the effects of induced mood on 
cognition and social behavior. 
Positive affect has been induced in a variety of 
ways and, despite the variety of procedures, the results of 
these mood inductions on social behavior and on cognition 
have been fairly consistent (see Isen, 1984, for a thorough 
review of this literature). It appears that induced 
positive affect increases helping behavior, as long as 
engaging in a behavior will not threaten this positive mood 
or interfere with personal freedom and independence. In 
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addition, an induced good mood results in a greater 
tendency for self reward, a greater preference for positive 
self-relevant information and a general increase in 
sociability and talkativeness. In line with the hypotheses 
of this study, these are the behaviors that are character-
istic of an extraverted individual (see Wilson, 1981; or 
Morris, 1979; for a review of the behavioral ~orrelates of 
extraversion). 
Positive affect has also been shown to influence 
cognitive processes. In terms of memory, induced good 
moods have resulted in subjects recalling positive trait 
words or positive past experiences more frequently and/or 
faster than control subjects (Bower, 1981; Isen, Shalker, 
Clark, & Karp, 1978; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979, Teasdale & 
Russell, 1983). In addition, subjects with induced 
positive moods were more likely to rate ambiguous pictures 
(scenes and faces) as more pleasant, had a lower tachisto-
scopic threshold for success related words, expressed 
expectations of future success more, and rated their 
household products as better than did controls. Finally, 
individuals with induced positive affect tended to rely on 
simplifying (generalizing), intuitive or heuristic thought 
styles in problem solving tasks (see Isen, 1984). 
Similar to the results of induced positive affect, 
Lishman (1972) found that subjects who were high in 
extraversion recalled more positive material in a delayed 
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incidental recall study. He also found (1974) that high E 
subjects recalled pleasant experiences faster than other 
subjects. Mayo (1983} extended this finding by showing 
that high E subjects still recalled more pleasant memories 
after current mood states were controlled for. Graziano, 
Feldesman, & Rahe (1985} found that individuals high in 
extraversion rated faces from unknown individuals more 
positively than did individuals low on this dimension. 
Additionally, a number of authors have found that extro-
verts process information differently than introverts. 
Introverts are more attentive to details and linear in 
their thinking, learning best in a structure didactic 
format, while extroverts tend to be more generalizing or 
global in their approach to a problem and learn best in an 
unstructured, informal teaching environment (see Morris, 
1979; Riding & Dyer, 1980; Wilson, 1981}. Thus, the 
cognitive processing that occurs as one moves along the 
extraversion dimension mirrors the cognitive processing one 
finds during positive affect induction. 
As mentioned above, the general picture that 
emerges from studies that have induced negative affect is 
less clear than the picture that emerges from studies which 
induced positive affect. A good number of studies have 
shown that negative feeling states reduce helping behavior 
or increase aggressive behavior. However, a number of 
studies have also found the opposite effect or found no 
effect at all. 
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Results of studies looking at neuroticism and 
cognitive processing have been less ambiguous and more 
consistent than those looking at negative affect and 
cognition (Martin, 1985). In light of the hypotheses of 
this present study, it is important to discuss briefly why 
results from negative affect induction procedures may 
reasonably be different and less consistent than studies 
examining N and cognitive processing. 
Isen (1984) discussed how the field is attempting 
to study "feelings" which are defined as pervasive and mild 
affective states. This focus is in contrast to studying 
"emotions" which are conceived as being more intense, 
specific and goal directed affective states (pp. 185 -
187). It appears then that this field is attempting to 
examine emotional "traits" rather than emotional "states". 
This is an important distinction to make because it is very 
likely that some individuals will be more responsive to 
emotional induction procedures if the emotion being induced 
is consistent with their particular emotional "traits". In 
other words, it is likely that in the above studies where 
emotional states were induced, the emotional induction 
procedure interacts with the general emotional level that 
an individual brings to the experimental setting (i.e. 
their degree of E or "trait" PA, and their degree of N or 
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Negative Affectivity). The mixed results found with the 
induction of negative affect are then likely to be due to 
"pleasantness restorative" functions. However, if the 
hypotheses of the present study are correct, it would be 
predicted that the efforts to restore states of pleasant 
emotions would only occur with individuals low on the 
personality dimension of N. Individuals high in neurotic-
ism are believed to experience more negative affect and, as 
such, would not be averse to its induction (see Hill, 
1985). A similar phenomenon is hypothesized to occur with 
PA induction along the E dimension. 
If this framework and two factor model of person-
ality/affect structure were adopted by researchers who are 
attempting to assess the influence of mood on cognition and 
behavior, greater clarity would likely be ob~ained in 
results across studies. That is, if one looked for 
individual differences in emotional "traits" and then 
designed studies with these groups in mind, greater 
statistical power for finding group differences could be 
had. If this was done, the random heterogeneity of 
respondents would not "wash-out" the effects of treatment 
which are really there for some groups. 
In the cognitive realm, research has confirmed that 
people in a negative mood will rate ambiguous slides as 
less pleasant, have lower tachistoscopic thresholds for 
failure related words, have a more negative conception of 
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others and have an increased expectation for aversive 
events to occur, when compared to controls (see Isen, 
1984). Additionally, it has been shown that people with 
induced negative affect are slower at recalling, or recall 
fewer pleasant experiences (Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979), and 
manifest a greater recall of unpleasant or unhappy exper-
iences (Teasdale, Taylor, & Fogarty, 1980). 
In studies of neuroticism and cognitive processing, 
Lishman (1974) found high N individuals to be slower at 
recalling pleasant experiences. In addition, he (Lloyd & 
Lishman, 1975) found this to be the case with depressed 
inpatients, even after the effects of current depressed 
mood states, as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory 
(Becket al., 1961; BDI) were partialed out. Mayo (1983) 
in a free recall of memories to stimulus words, also found 
that high N individuals recalled fewer pleasant experiences 
and more unpleasant or unhappy experiences. This again was 
the case even when the effects of current despondent and 
anxious mood states were partialed out. 
Similar to the above findings, Young & Martin 
(1981) found in a recall task of self-relevant trait terms 
from a word list, that increasing levels of N correlated 
with a greater recall of negative self-relevant terms. 
Martin, Ward, & Clark (1983) found that this type of 
cognitive processing occurred only with self-relevant 
information and was not the case when information was 
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processed about others. It was also found that others were 
not necessarily seen in a more positive light, indicating 
that high N individuals selectively process negative 
information about the self and do not necessarily see the 
world from a negative framework. 
Thus, while there is not total agreement between 
studies of negative affect induction and studies of 
neuroticism, there is mounting evidence that these two 
processes are tapping the same dimensions within people. 
A further indication that N and NA are the same 
constructs can be seen in a study by Wilkinson and Black-
burn (1981; see Martin, 1985). These authors found that 
individuals high on neuroticism gave negative interpreta-
tions and non-self-attributions for positive events occur-
ring, while they gave negative interpretations and self-
attributions for the occurrence of negative events. This 
was the case even when the effects of current depressed 
mood were partialed out. However, more significantly, they 
found that the same attributional relationships held when 
neuroticism was partialed out of the current state of 
depressed mood. It then appears that both N and NA 
contribute to, as well as sustain independently, a similar 
attributional process (within, of course, the parameters of 
the reliability and validity of the measurement instruments 
used). 
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There are internal validity threats inherent in 
studies that look at the E and N dimensions of personality 
as independent variables and then use the retrieval of 
positive and negative life event memories as the dependent 
measure of cognitive processing (i.e., Lishman, 1974; Lloyd 
and Lishman, 1975; Mayo, 1983). Because the Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire in many respects asks for 
cognitions about one's life (i.e., "would you consider 
yourself 'happy-go-lucky' .. , or "are you an irritable 
person?"), there is a threat to causality due to the bi-
directional nature of the correlational results. That is, 
there is really no way to say what causes what. It could 
be that high N causes a greater recall of negative life 
events, but, just as likely, greater recall of negative 
life events could cause high N (or, of course, there could 
be a third moderator variable). Fortunately, the method-
ology in this realm ·is sophisticated and diverse enough in 
its dependent measures to indicate that N influences 
cognitive processing independent of the above overlap (see 
Martin, 1985) . 
Table 4 summarizes the lines of convergence 
discussed above. By referring to Table 4, it can be seen 
that, in general, the cognitive processing and the social 
behavior that occurs after induced positive affect is very 
similar to the cognitive processing and social behavior of 
extraverted individuals. Similarly, the cognitive process-
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Table 4. Evidence for the congruence of Positive Affect 
(PA) with extraversion (E) and of Negative Affect(NA) with 
Neuroticism. 
----------------------------------------------------------
DESCRIPTIVE SIMILARITIES 
N and NA E and PA 
Higher in women. 
Significantly correlated. 
NA is more easily induced 
in high N individuals. 
No sex differences. 
Significantly correlated. 
INTERACTIONS WITH A THIRD VARIABLEa 
N and NA 
Greater induction of NA in 1 
premenstrual women. I 
I 
N is higher in premenstrual 1 
women. 
Negative interpretations 
and non-self-attributions 
for positive events. 
Negative interpretations 
and self-attributions for 
negative events. 
Slower recall of pleasant 
life experiences. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Greater recall of unpleasant! 
or unhappy life events. 1 
I 
E and PA 
Greater helping behavior. 
Greater self reward. 
Greater sociability and 
talkativeness. 
Greater recall of positive 
trait terms (faster and 
more frequent). 
Ambiguous faces rated as 
more pleasant. 
Simplifying or intuitive 
thought style. 
Note: reference sources for these statements are given in 
the text. aAll statements are descriptive of behavior at 
the high end of each dimension. 
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ing that occurs when negative affect is induced, and 
strategies to overcome this affect are not employed, is 
very similar to the cognitive processing found with 
individuals high in Neuroticism. Thus, it appears that 
positive affect and extraversion share a common source, as 
do negative affect and neuroticism. 
STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Preliminary hypotheses 
1) Data will be collected from two campuses and 
need to be pooled for analysis. As such, it is predicted 
that extraversion and neuroticism scores on the EPQ will 
not differ across campuses. Confirmation of this hypothe-
ses allows for a pooled sample base without biases. 
2) The measures of personality (extraversion and 
neuroticism scores from the EPQ; Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975) 
will be the only standardized and previously validated 
measures this study will employ. Since this is the case, 
it is proposed that the obtained sample of subjects will 
show scoring equivalent to normative samples (Eysenck, 
S.B.G., et al., 1986) on theE and N scale of the EPQ 
(Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975). Nested within this hypothesis 
is the expectation that females will show higher N scores 
than males. 
3) It is hypothesized that a confirmatory factor 
analysis of the extraversion and neuroticism items from 
Eysenck's measure of personality, will show a clear 
differentiation and discrimination of the two proposed 
dimensions. 
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4) Using the model put forth by Watson and 
Tellegen (1985), it is hypothesized that a confirmatory 
principal axes factor analysis (with R-sguares on the 
diagonal and rotated to orthogonal structure) of the 
"general" emotions questionnaire (explained fully below) 
will show the dimensions they term PA and NA emerging as 
the first two dominant dimensions. That is, based on the 
"elbow" seen in the plot of the eigen values, a two-factor 
solution will be the most appropriate one. Within this 
two-factor solution High and Low Negative Affect terms will 
load significantly on only one dimension and will be the 
terms which define this dimension. Additionally, the terms 
of High and Low Positive Affect will load significantly 
only on the other dimension and will be the terms which 
define this dimension. Terms of Unpleasantness, Disengage-
ment, Pleasantness, and Strong Engagement will show 
significant loadings on both of the dimensions and will 
fall in the appropriate quadrants within this two-dimen-
sional space. 
5) The factor structure of self-rated emotion will 
be the same, regardless of whether subjects are asked to 
rate how they have felt in the past day (a state measure) 
or if they are asked to rate how they generally feel (a 
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trait measure). This hypothesis will be quantitatively 
analyzed by correlating the factor loadings of emotional 
terms across the "state" and "trait" response formats. It 
is expected that correlations near unity will be found for 
both PA and NA. 
Hypotheses of convergence 
6) Based on the hypothesis that NA is equivalent 
to neuroticism, and consistent with earlier findings (Brad-
burn, 1969; Harding, 1982;), it is expected that the NA 
scale will show a sex difference, with females reporting 
significantly higher levels of NA than males. 
7) As a preliminary indication that PA and NA are 
equivalent to E and N, respectively, a multitrait-multi-
method matrix will be developed (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). 
Although both methods will be self-report, they differ in 
the fact that the affect questionnaire is a Likert-type 
rating scale in response to single affect terms, while the 
EPQ employs a forced choice response format to descriptive 
sentences. It is expected that all of the convergent 
validity correlations will be significant and their 
magnitude will be higher than previous studies which 
employed the Bradburn measure (Costa & McCrea, 1980, 1984; 
Warr et al., 1983), because of the problems noted with that 
particular measure. The discriminant validity coefficients 
are expected to be appropriately low (non-significant), and 
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approximately equivalent in their magnitude between E and N 
and between PA and NA (i.e. PA and NA are expected to 
correlate to the same degree as E and N). 
8) As a final step, the NA and PA terms will be 
combined with the N and E items in a confirmatory principal 
axes factor analysis rotated to orthogonal structure. As 
it is expected from hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 6 that two 
factors will emerge in each case, it is deemed appropriate 
to use a confirmatory procedure for this last analysis. As 
we are concerned with the most dominant dimensions in this 
analysis, the number of factors to be extracted will be 
determined by the visual "elbow" seen in a plot of the 
eigenvalues. It is expected that this "eLbow" will 
indicate a two-factor solution as the most appropriate 
solution for characterizing the data at the broadest level 
of analysis. Within this two-factor solution the NA terms 
of affect and the N items from the EPQ will load together 
to define a single dimension. The PA terms of affect and 
the E items from the EPQ will also load together and will 
define the other dimension in this solution. 
Though not a strict hypothesis, a final prediction 
can be made at this point. Since the E and N dimensions 
are conceptualized here as stable and "distal" variables, 
it is expected that if there are discrepancies between the 
hypothesized structure of the emotions questionnaire and 
the observed structure of the emotions questionnaire, the 
72 
inclusion of these distal variables will aid in interpret-
ing the discrepancies. In other words, it is expected that 
the structure of E and N will help to clarify the dominant 
dimensions of affect if the dimensions of affect that 
emerge under hypothesis 4 are not exactly as Watson and 
Tellegen have predicted. 
Method 
subjects and Procedures 
Subjects were 231 undergraduates at Loyola Univer-
sity of Chicago (99 males, 121 females, and 11 who did not 
indicate their gender). All subjects participated in this 
study for course credit. However, participants were drawn 
from two different campuses. One hundred and twenty three 
subjects were drawn from the Psychology Department's 
subject pool at Loyola's Lake Shore Campus (LSC). An 
additional 98 subjects were recruited from psychology 
classes at Loyola's Water Tower Campus (WTC). The LSC has 
both dormitory facilities and a commuter population of 
students, while the WTC has no dormitory housing and all 
students are commuters. 
Students at the LSC were tested in small groups of 
between four and 20 students. They completed the Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire - Revised edition (Eysenck, 
S.B.G., et al., 1985) and two emotion questionnaires based 
on the work of Watson and Tellegen (1985). All measures 
will be discussed more fully below. This packet of 
questionnaires took students approximately 15 minutes to 
complete. 
Students at the WTC were tested differently. These 
students were assessed three times as part of a longitudi-
nal study. However, the data from the first assessment is 
all that will be explored here. Subjects from this campus 
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were given the same packet of materials given students from 
the LSC. In addition, they were given a human figure 
drawing test. The drawings, again part of a different 
study, came after the packet of personality and affect 
materials and should not have affected the results in any 
way. Students were given all materials and asked to fill 
them out at home in one sitting. Subjects then returned 
their packets of data to their class professor within two 
weeks of when they were first received (although a good 
portion returned them almost immediately). 
Measures 
Affect. The emotion questionnaires used are displayed in 
Appendix B. The first 38 terms on each questionnaire are 
the terms presented by Watson and Tellegen (1985) as the 
terms that best mark each of the major dimensions of 
affect. Their order of presentation is random. ·However, 
different forms of the questionnaires were not used to 
counter position effects. The last two terms on each 
questionnaire (impulsive and anxious) were added by the 
experimenter to see if they would fall between the dimen-
sions of PA and NA, as would be expected by the thesis of 
this study and the arguments of Gray (1981). Gray, it may 
be recalled, argues that the dominant dimensions of 
personality are impulsivity and anxiety. He proposes that 
these dimensions fall at approximately 45 degree angles to 
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Eysenck's dimensions of E and N. Because their position in 
a two dimensional affect space was not addressed by Watson 
and Tellegen, these terms were not included in any of the 
confirmatory factor analyses, and consequently their 
position was not addressed in this research. Further, 
these terms were purposely placed at the end of the 
questionnaire to prevent them biasing any of the other 
terms. 
The response format used in the emotions question-
naires was based on the work of Meddis (1972) and Russell 
(1979). The response options (very unlike me; unlike me; 
like me; and very like me; scored 0, 1, 2, 3 respectively) 
are symmetrical and do not leave open the possibility of 
subjects replying that they cannot decide. As was reported 
earlier, this response format is less subject to bias than 
other response formats. 
The two emotion questionnaires in Appendix B were 
given to all subjects. One was termed a "General" emotions 
questionnaire and the other was termed a "Current" emotions 
questionnaire. The only difference between these two 
questionnaires was the way the introduction was worded. On 
the "General" questionnaire, subjects were asked to 
indicate how they "generally feel" with regards to the 
emotion terms presented, while on the "Current" question-
naire, subjects were asked to indicate how they had felt 
"in the past day" with regards to the terms presented. The 
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"General" questionnaire was used as an index of "trait" 
affect, while the "Current" questionnaire was used as a 
"state" index. Based on the Watson and Clark (1984) 
concept of Negative Affectivity, it was thought that the 
"trait" index would provide the best comparison measure for 
extraversion and neuroticism. 
Personality. For assessing the personality traits of E and 
N, the 100-item, forced choice Eysenck Personality Quest-
ionnaire- Revised version (Eysenck, S.B.G., et al., 1985; 
EPQ-R) was used. This measure is the most recent revision 
by the Eysencks' for assessing the personality dimensions 
of extraversion, neuroticism (emotionality), psychoticism 
(toughmindedness- P), and lie (naivety- L). The greatest 
change in this scale from its predecessor, the Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975; EPQ), 
was in revisions made to the psychoticism scale. The P 
scale on the EPQ had a low reliability, a low range of 
scoring and a very skewed distribution of scores. The new 
scale on the EPQ-R corrected these faults by taking out six 
old P items and adding 13 new P items. These changes are 
not of great concern for the present study. However, some 
minor changes were made to the old Nand E scales as well. 
On the EPQ-R scale of neuroticism, one additional item was 
added: "When your temper rises do you find it difficult to 
control?". Thus, the new scale has 24 items rather than 
the former 23. The added N item does not appear to change 
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the content of the scale much; however, the same may not be 
able to be said for the extraversion scale. 
Two new items were added to theE scale ("Have 
people said that sometimes you act too rashly?" and "Do 
you often make decisions on the spur of the moment?"), 
making it a 23 item scale. These changes were not dis-
cussed by the authors (Eysenck, S.B.G., et al., 1985), but 
it is apparent that the added items are impulsivity items. 
Impulsivity had been a large component of the E scale in 
the Eysenck Personality Inventory (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968; 
EPI), but had been removed, in large part, from theE scale 
on the EPQ (see Rocklin & Revelle, 1981), leaving the EPQ E 
scale as predominantly a measure of sociability and 
activity. There has been some debate as to whether 
impulsivity should be considered a component of extra-
version or a component of neuroticism (see McCrea & Costa, 
1985). However, a number of researchers have noted that 
impulsivity, as a component of extraversion, was respon-
sible for a number of the physiological correlates of 
extraversion (see Rocklin & Revelle, 1981; Revelle, 
Humphreys, Simon, & Gilliland, 1980). It was not clear how 
these two new items would affect the extraversion scale of 
the EPQ-R, though it should make this scale more compatible 
with results found by the E scale of the EPI. However, it 
would also probably function differently than the E scale 
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on the EPQ - possibly by increasing the correlation between 
E and N. 
As a result of the uncertainty regarding the EPQ-R, 
all results from this study were conducted with the EPQ's N 
and E scales. The E and N scale was formed by simply 
dropping the items that were added to these scales in the 
latest version (EPQ-R) of the personality scale. 
RESULTS 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES 
Across both student populations (campuses), there 
were no significant differences on the EPQ extraversion and 
neuroticism scales. For the Lake Shore subjects the mean E 
score was 14.67, while for the Water Tower subjects the 
mean E score was 14.41 (!(218)= 0.44, ~= .66). For 
neuroticism scores, the mean at the Lake Shore campus was 
12.33, while at the Lewis Towers campus the mean N score 
was 13.53 (!(218)= 1.65, ~=.101). While the last statistic 
indicates a trend for neuroticism scores to be higher at 
the Lewis Towers campus, the difference does not appear 
extreme enough to question the pooling of the sample data 
from both campuses. Additionally, even though there was a 
statistically significant difference in the average age 
between both campuses (mean at Lewis Towers = 20.36, range 
from 16 to 41; mean at Lake Shore = 19.07, range from 18 to 
34; t = 3.63, ~ < .001) the actual difference was slight 
and was not considered great enough to prevent pooling the 
data. The age difference should not have been a factor in 
the trend for N to be greater at the Lewis Towers Campus, 
as N decreases with age (Eysenck, S.B.G., et al., 1986). 
The mean extraversion and neuroticism scores from 
this study were compared to the means that were found in a 
non-quota sample of 879 American students (Eysenck, S.B.G., 
79 
80 
et al., 1986). This was as close to an appropriate 
standardization sample as could be obtained, and the 
average age for this population was 20. Sexes were 
analyzed separately and there were no significant differen-
ces among the two scales for females (sample mean for E = 
14.62, SD = 4.57, standardization sample mean= 15.3, SD = 
4.35, !(665)= 1.536, 2> .12; sample mean for N = 13.06, SD 
= 5.63, standardization sample mean = 12.75, SD = 5.04, 
~(665)= .322, 2> .6). For males there was no difference 
between the sample and the standardization group in terms 
of extraversion (sample mean= 14.59, SD = 4.17, standard-
ization mean= 14.83, SD = 4.15, ~(429)= .502, 2> .3). 
However, there was a significant ·difference in neuroticism 
scores; with the male sample subjects showing a signifi-
cantly higher mean level of neuroticism (sample mean = 
12.64, SD = 5.13, standardization sample = 10.55, SD = 
5.41, !(429)= 3.385, 2< .001). 
It was expected that females in the sample would 
have shown significantly greater neuroticism scores than 
males. However, this was not the case. The mean neurotic-
ism score for males was 12.64 and for females it was 13.06 
(!(218)= .57, 2 =.57). Apparently, because the males 
scored significantly higher on this dimension than the 
norm, the typical sex difference was not found. As 
expected, there was no difference between males and females 
on extraversion scores for this sample (mean for males = 
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14.59, mean for females= 14.62). It is unclear why the 
males in this sample had higher than normal levels of 
neuroticism. However, because of this finding, it was 
deemed appropriate to assess whether the N scores combined 
across both sexes were higher for this sample than for the 
standardization sample. The overall mean N score for this 
sample was 12.87 (~ = 29.82) while for the standardization 
sample the pooled N score was 11.9 (~ = 27.01). This 
resulted in a significant difference between both groups 
(!(1099)= 2.41, ~< .02). It is unclear if or how this 
result will affect the subsequent factor structure of the 
EPQ. 
To assess the factor structure of the EPQ, a 
principal axes factor analysis was performed (with R 
squares on the diagonal) on all of the items from the E 
scale of the EPQ and all of the items on the N scale of the 
EPQ. The first step in this analysis was an assessment of 
a plot of the eigen values. As can be seen in Figure 3, a 
clear elbow formed at the third factor indicating that a 
two factor solution was appropriate. A two factor solution 
accounted for 58.22% .of the common variance. When this was 
further broken down, the first factor accounted for 31.01% 
of the common variance and the second factor accounted for 
27.21% of the common variance. The extraction of a third 
factor would have resulted in a minimal increase (6.3~%) in 
the amount of common variance that was explainable. 
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Figure 3. Plot of the factors and corresponding eigenval-
ues in a principal factor analysis of the EPQ E and N 
items. 
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A Varimax rotation to simple structure was per-
formed on the two factor solution. This process resulted 
in a clear discrimination of items. By looking at Table 5, 
it can be seen that all of the N items loaded most strongly 
on the first factor, while all of the E items loaded most 
strongly on the second factor, confirming the hypothesized 
EPQ factor structure. 
The next stage of this analysis was to conduct a 
principal axes factor analysis of the emotion question-
naire. However, before an adequate factor analysis of the 
"general" emotions questionnaire could be performed, three 
of the emotional terms had to be dropped. These three 
terms - dull, placid, and guiescent - were producing an 
ill-conditioned correlation matrix, which is an indication 
that subjects responded to these items inconsistently. 
Significantly, while subjects were filling out the quest-
ionnaires, placid and guiescent were the only terms that 
people were unsure of, and subjects frequently asked for 
the definition of these terms (especially guiescent). If 
it is assumed that many subjects did not ask for clarifica-
tion, yet were also confused by these terms, there is 
fairly good evidence that these terms were often misunder-
stood. The meaning of dull, on the other hand, was never 
questioned. This is reasonable, given its common usage. 
However, the connotations to this term are certainly 
variable (e.g. boring, unintelligent, blunted, and tired), 
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Table 5. Loadings of Neuroticism {N) and extraversion (E) 
items in a principal axes factor analysis of the EPQ 
{Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975) rotated to Varimax simple 
structure. 
----------------------------------------------------------
Item 
N6 
N19 
N7 
N9 
Nl 
Nll 
N14 
N8 
N10 
N20 
N2 
N5 
N16 
N4 
N21 
N18 
N13 
N3 
N17 
N15 
N22 
N23 
N12 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
. 63 . 12 
.62 -.19 
.62 .10 
.61 -.18 
.56 -.03 
.55 -.14 
.54 -.12 
.53 -.18 
.52 -.01 
.51 -.18 
. 49 . 04 
.48 -.12 
.47 .03 
.46 -.11 
.46 -.11 
.45 -.09 
.43 -.06 
.41 .15 
.41 -.17 
.41 -.21 
.28 .15 
• 26 • 02 
.12 .06 
Item 
E13 
E23 
E21 
E3 
E6 
E2 
El2 
Ell 
E15 
E4 
E9 
E22 
E8 
E5 
E7 
E20 
E10 
El 
E18 
El4 
E17 
Factor 1 
-.11 
.04 
-.09 
-.04 
-.18 
-.00 
-.17 
.06 
.00 
-.15 
-.10 
.01 
-.00 
.05 
.04 
.24 
-.13 
-.12 
-.23 
-.01 
-.02 
Factor 2 
.66 
.63 
.62 
.60 
.59 
.58 
.55 
.55 
.53 
.52 
.46 
.42 
.41 
.39 
.35 
.33 
.30 
.26 
.24 
.23 
.09 
{Note: the items are numbered by how they appear in the 
EPQ-R [Eysenck, S.B.G., et al., 1985] and items that were 
added to the E and N scale in this revised version have 
been omitted from the analyses [eg. E16, E19, and N24]. 
All items have been coded positively.) 
which again is an indication that this term may have been 
responded to inconsistently. 
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It is worth noting that each of the three terms 
which caused confusion in this study were used infrequently 
by other authors who examined affect structure. Of the 
nine studies that Watson and Tellegen (1985) reanalyzed 
while developing the model shown in Figure 1, the term dull 
was only used twice while the terms quiescent and placid 
were only used in a single study. 
With quiescent, placid, and dull, eliminated from 
further analysis, the factor model proposed by Watson and 
Tellegen was assessed in the present data. 
In the principal factor analysis, a plot of the 
eigen values again revealed a distinct "elbow" at the third 
factor, indicating that the first two factors accounted for 
the greatest proportion of explainable variance (see Figure 
4). Combined, the first two factors accounted for 64% of 
the common variance. When this was broken down, the first 
factor accounted for 38.7% of the common variance, while 
the second factor accounted for an additional 25.7% of the 
common variance. 
Following the traditional eigen-value-greater-than-
one criteria for factor extraction would have resulted in 
the extraction of eight small and unipolar factors. 
Because of the small amount of common variance that could 
be explained with these additional factors (e.g., the third 
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Figure 4. Plot of the factors and corresponding eigen-
values in a principle factor analysis of the trait emotions 
questionnaire. 
9-
1 
I 
I 
I 
8-
1 
I 
I 
I 
7-. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
6-
1 
I 
I 
E I 
I 5-
G I 
E I 
N I 
v I 
A 4-
L I 
u I 
E I 
s I 
3-
1 
I 
I 
I 
2-
1 
I 
I 
I 
l-
1 
I 
I 
I . 
l----l----l----1----l----l----l----1----l----l----l 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
FACTORS 
87 
factor only accounted for 5.2% of the common variance), and 
because our focus is on the broadest dimensions of affec-
tive structure, this solution would have been inappropriate 
tor present purposes. Thus, the analysis proceeded with a 
two factor solution. 
A Varimax rotation to simple structure revealed the 
factor loadings displayed in Table 6. It can be seen that 
the terms loading most strongly on factor 1 clearly defines 
it as a dimension of negative affect. Factor 2, on the 
other hand, is strongly defined by positive affect terms. 
The factor loadings given in Table 6 did not 
exactly replicate the proposed factor structure put forth 
by Watson and Tellegen, and call into question whether this 
analysis actually confirmed their model. Of the 35 affect 
terms included in this analysis, 19 terms loaded exactly 
where they were hypothesized to fall within this two 
dimensional structure. These terms were distressed, 
fearful, hostile, jittery, nervous, scornful, elated, 
enthusiastic, excited, peppy, strong, lonely, unhappy, 
content, happy, pleased, satisfied, astonished, and 
surprised. Thus, it .can be seen that the terms which were 
proposed to define high Negative Affect, Strong Engagement, 
high Positive Affect, and Pleasantness all fell were they 
were expected to. Only seven of the 35 terms fell more 
than 45 degrees from where they were hypothesized to fall. 
These terms were sorry, drowsy, sleepy, sluggish, quiet, 
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Table 6. Terms and factor loadings on the two-factor 
solution of "general" emotion terms proposed by Watson and 
Tellegen (1985), rotated to Varimax simple structure and 
listed by decreasing magnitude of loading. 
-----------------------------------------------------------
TERMS 
distressed 
sad 
blue 
unhappy 
lonely 
sluggish 
drowsy 
grouchy 
jittery 
sorry 
fearful 
sleepy 
nervous 
hostile 
scornful 
relaxed 
calm 
still 
excited 
elated 
enthusiastic 
happy 
peppy 
active 
pleased 
content 
surprised 
aroused 
satisfied 
warmhearted 
strong 
astonished 
kindly 
quiet 
at rest 
FACTOR 1 
.779 
.753 
.730 
.710 
.696 
.648 
.623 
.606 
.596 
.587 
.586 
.569 
.559 
.539 
.467 
-.413 
.353 
.211 
.078 
.031 
-.067 
-.365 
.031 
-.293 
-.349 
-.443 
.277 
.168 
-.411 
-.100 
-.117 
.299 
-.099 
.255 
-.065 
FACTOR 2 
-.088 
-.058 
-.156 
-.242 
-.209 
-.160 
-.051 
-.195 
.044 
.157 
.003 
-.063 
.094 
-.077 
-.049 
.339 
.254 
-.117 
.713 
.647 
.635 
.625 
.595 
.594 
.546 
.529 
.520 
.520 
.503 
.420 
.402 
.324 
.322 
-.256 
.251 
Note: Loadings of .201 or greater are significant at the 
.05 level, loadings of .234 or greater are significant at 
the .01 level. Both significance levels are Bonferron1 
corrected to account for the large number of loadings 
analyzed. 
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still, and at rest. It can be seen by a look at Figure 1 
that, with the exception of sorry, all of these terms were 
expected to define either low Positive Affect, low Negative 
Affect, or Disengagement. 
The apparent collapse of the low end of these 
dimensions may have been, in part, due to the exclusion of 
dull, placid, and guiescent - all of which are terms that 
would have helped to define the low affect domains within 
this model. Watson and Tellegen (1985) indicate that it is 
essential to include terms of low affective states in order 
to obtain an adequate definition of mood structure. 
Therefore, it is possible that the failure to replicate the 
Watson and Tellegen model in this analysis was due to the 
exclusion of the above terms. 
Watson and Tellegen (1985) also note that it is 
particularly important to include terms which denote 
disengaged states in order to obtain the bipolar factors 
which are expected to occur within a two factor solution. 
It can be seen that both factors in the present analysis 
were primarily unipolar rather than bipolar. Again, it may 
be that the results found in the present analysis suffer 
because three of the eleven terms (27 percent) which denote 
low affective states have been removed. 
An additional area of concern, potentially related 
to the collapse of the low ends of the dimensions discussed 
above, is the qu~stionable differentiation of terms 
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hypothesized to define Unpleasantness from terms hypothe-
sized to define high Negative Affect. As expected, unhappy 
and lonely loaded significantly and positively on the 
dimension of negative affect and significantly and nega-
tively on the dimension of positive affect. The terms 
grouchy and blue showed a similar placement, though their 
negative loadings on the positive affect dimension did not 
reach statistical significance. The term sad had a 
negative, though nonsignificant and negligible, loading on 
the positive affect dimension. The term sorry also had a 
nonsignificant loading on the dimension of positive affect, 
however, it loaded positively on this dimension, which was 
unexpected. 
Given the ambiguities that were found in the 
present results, it still needed to be determined if the 
emergent positive and negative affect dimensions were 
equivalent to the dimensions of Positive and Negative 
Affect described by Watson and Tellegen. 
In order to assess this question accurately, it 
must be recalled that the model presented in Figure 1 is a 
schematic representation of the proposed model. The factor 
structure that would correspond to Figure 1 has never been 
found in any single study. In fact, there is only one 
published study (Zevon and Tellegen, 1982) which reported 
factor loadings for each emotion term on the dimensions of 
Positive and Negative Affect. Unfortunately, this study 
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used many terms which were not part of the proposed model, 
and did not include all of the terms which were proposed to 
define the model. Despite these limitations, comparing the 
factor structure found in this study with the factor 
structure reported by Zevon and Tellegen would give a rough 
quantitative assessment of similarity. 
Using the procedure suggested by Rummel (1970), a 
simple correlation of factor loadings across terms common 
to both studies was conducted. There were 18 terms from 
the current study which overlapped with terms in the Zevon 
and Tellegen (1982) study. These terms were enthusiastic, 
excited, strong, active, happy, warmhearted, sleepy, 
sluggish, distressed, hostile, scornful, nervous, jittery, 
sad, blue, lonely, content, and calm. It can be seen that 
the overlapping terms included markers of high and low 
Negative Affect, high and low Positive Affect, Unpleasant-
ness, and Pleasantness. The loadings of all 18 common 
terms on the positive affect dimension across both studies 
correlated .95. The same correlation, .95, was found 
between both studies when all terms were correlated across 
the dimension of negative affect. Thus, despite the fact 
that the results of the current analysis do not exactly 
conform to the schematic model presented in Figure 1, it is 
clear that factor 1 in the present study is essentially the 
same as the dimension of Negative Affect in the Zevon and 
Tellegen study. Likewise, factor 2 in the current study is 
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essentially the same as the dimension of Positive Affect in 
the Zevon and Tellegen study. 
Since both a "state" and "trait" questionnaire were 
used to assess the emotions of each subject, a comparison 
between each of these response conditions was deemed 
appropriate. If the factor structure was equivalent across 
both questionnaires, it would provide additional support 
for the validity of the factor structure listed in Table 6. 
As such, it was expected that the correlation of factor 
loadings across an orthogonal two-factor solution for trait 
affect and an orthogonal two-factor solution for state 
affect would be near unity. In strong support of this 
hypothesis, it was found that the loadings of all terms on 
the dimensions of Positive Affect correlated .972 across 
the two questionnaires. The procedure for this analysis 
was to correlate the factor loadings of all 35 terms on 
both the dimension of Positive Affect from the trait 
analysis and the dimension of Positive Affect from the 
state analysis. Using the same procedure, the loadings of 
terms on the dimensions of Negative Affect showed a 
slightly stronger correlation of .985 across the two 
questionnaires. Therefore, it appears clear that the two-
factor model is robust across both state and trait meas-
ures. 
Further evidence of the robust nature of these two 
dimensions can be seen by comparing the factors that 
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emerged in the principal axes factor analysis with the 
first two factors in a principal components analysis 
rotated to orthogonal simple structure. Because these two 
procedures analyze the data through different processes, 
convergence across both types of analyses would again argue 
for the validity of the factors outlined above. By using 
the same correlational procedure described above, it was 
found that the factor of Positive Affect (using the trait 
questionnaire) from the principle axes analysis correlated 
.999 with the Positive Affect factor (again trait) from the 
principal components analysis. In similar fashion, the 
Negative Affect dimension from the principal axes analysis 
correlated .9998 with the Negative Affect dimension from 
the principal components analysis. 
In summary then, even though the factors that 
emerged in this analysis were not identical to the sche-
matic diagram presented by Watson and Tellegen (1985), 
there are several lines of evidence which indicate that the 
observed factor structure is robust and stable. In 
addition, the dimensions of Positive and Negative Affect 
found here are almost identical to the dimensions of 
Positive and Negative Affect reported by Zevon and Tellegen 
(1982). Therefore, despite the fact that these results do 
not exactly conform to the model put forth in Figure 1, the 
resultant factor structure is a viable one. An explanation 
of why the present factor structure is the best two-factor 
description of emotional experience will be presented in 
the Discussion. 
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Because the results found here provided substantial 
support for the two factor model of affect, but only 
partial support for the model proposed in Figure 1, there 
was ambiguity over how to proceed with the two additional 
hypotheses for which a scale of Positive Affect or Negative 
Affect was necessary. These two hypotheses involved the 
assessment of Negative Affect across sexes, and the 
development of a multitrait-multimethod matrix to assess 
the convergence and discrimination of dimensions of affect 
and personality. Four options were available for scale 
development. The first option would have been to compose a 
scale of all the terms in Figure 1 which were proposed to 
define Positive and Negative Affect. However, this was not 
a viable option because it was seen earlier that the low 
ends of each proposed dimension of affect did not emerge. 
The second option was to develop a scale based solely on 
the terms which emerged in the current analysis to define 
each dimension. This appeared to be a suitable option, 
though the use of this procedure makes the eventual results 
dependent upon the biases that may be inherent in the 
current sample population. A third option would have been 
to develop scales of PA and NA that are based only upon the 
terms that have been found in the current analysis to 
define high PA and high NA. This option would take into 
95 
account the ambiguities and apparent difficulties with the 
terms that are markers of low affective states. Eleven of 
the 12 terms which mark high PA and high NA in the Watson 
and Tellegen model were found to define high PA and high NA 
in the current analysis. The only exception was the term 
active which loaded significantly on both PA and NA; when 
it was hypothesized to load significantly only on PA. It 
may have been that the term active loaded significantly on 
NA because of an idiosyncracy in the present sample. If 
this were the case, the third option would not be a viable 
one, especially since it could compound the errors that may 
be present in the use of the second option. To guard 
against this possibility, a fourth and final option for 
scale development, and one that could be used in combina-
tion with the second option, was to develop scales of PA 
and NA by using the terms that define high PA and high NA 
in Figure 1, without regard to where these terms place in 
the current sample. 
Given the above options to address the two remain-
ing hypotheses which needed a scale of PA and NA for their 
quantitative assessment, two different scales of each 
dimension of affect were developed. The first scale to 
assess each dimension consisted of all terms that were 
found to clearly define each dimension in the current 
analyses. These scales were termed PAl and NA1. PAl was 
composed of the terms elated, enthusiastic, excited, peppy, 
96 
strong, aroused, warmhearted, kindly, and at rest. NA1 was 
composed of the terms distressed, fearful, hostile, 
jittery, nervous, scornful, sad, blue, sluggish, drowsy, 
grouchy, sorrY, sleepy and still. The second scale to 
assess each dimension consisted of the terms proposed by 
watson and Tellegen to define the high ends of PA and NA. 
These scales were termed PA2 and NA2. PA2 was composed of 
the terms elated, enthusiastic, excited, peppy, strong, and 
active. NA2 was composed of the terms distressed, fearful, 
hostile, jittery, nervous, and scornful. It was hoped that 
the use of both scales would balance any potential biases 
that may have been present in either the Watson and 
Tellegen model or in the current sample. 
CONVERGENT ANALYSES 
It was initially hypothesized that NA, mirroring 
neuroticism, would show a significant sex difference, with 
females displaying higher levels of NA .. However, since N 
did not differ across sexes, it could be anticipated that 
NA should also not show a significant difference across 
sexes. For the scale NA1 there was not a significant sex 
difference (mean for males = 16.6, mean for females = 15.8, 
!(218) = .87, ~ = .39). Likewise, for the NA2 scale there 
was not a significant sex difference (mean for males= 6.7, 
mean for females= 6.22, !(218) = 1.01, ~ = .31). Thus, 
even though these results would not be consistent with 
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expectations for a normative population, they are consist-
ent with expectations for the current sample. 
The multitrait-multimethod matrix is shown in Table 
1. It can be seen that there is evidence for both conver-
gent and discriminant validity. As would be expected, the 
affect scales, which share the same method of data collec-
tion as well as some of the same affect terms, show signif-
icant and very high convergence correlations (PAl with PA2, 
NAl with NA2). The other convergent correlations, which 
use different methods of assessing the same construct, show 
the significant and strong positive correlations that were 
expected (E with the Positive Affect scales, N with the 
Negative Affect scales). Overall, it is clear that the 
magnitude of the convergent correlations exceed the magni-
tude of the divergent measures of association by a large 
margin. The divergent validity coefficients are generally 
nonsignificant, and all are negative. It can be seen that 
extraversion showed a significant and negative relationship 
with the neuroticism and Negative Affect scales. Ideally, 
the Positive Affect scales would have shown the same 
significant relationship as E across all of these divergent 
measures. The fact that the Positive Affect scales did not 
show the same magnitude of relationship to N and NA as did 
E may be solely the consequence of a PA being assessed by a 
different methodology than E. However, this may also be a 
preliminary indication that PA, as measured here, is 
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Table 7. The multitrait-multimethod correlation matrix of 
summed scores on extraversion (E), neuroticism (N), 
Positive Affect 1 (PAl), Positive Affect 2 (PA2), Negative 
Affect 1 (NAl), and Negative Affect 2 (NA2). See text for 
a description of the affect scales. 
I 
I 
E I 
I 
I 
E 
PAl I .57*** 
I 
I 
PA2 I .48*** 
I 
I 
N 1-.2o** 
I 
I 
NAl 1-.22** 
I 
I 
NA2 1-.30*** 
I 
*** 12. < .001 
** 12. < .01 
* 12. < • 05 
PAl PA2 N NAl NA2 
.92*** 
-.13 -.08 
-.09 -.05 .62*** 
-.18** -.12 .66*** .91*** 
somewhat distinct from extraversion, suggesting that the 
dimensions of affect may have a greater independence from 
each other than do the dimensions of personality. 
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Previously, the Bradburn scales have been used to 
assess the degree of convergence between positive affect/-
extraversion and negative affect/neuroticism. Several 
reasons were pointed out earlier which explained why the 
Bradburn measures have not shown the degree of convergence 
with E and N that would be expected if the hypotheses of 
this study were correct. Among other reasons, it was noted 
that the Bradburn scales of positive and negative affect 
included assessments of Pleasantness and Displeasure, which 
were believed to attenuate the expected high correlations 
with extraversion and neuroticism. As such, it was hypoth-
esized that the magnitude of convergence found in this 
study would exceed the magnitude of convergence reported in 
any of the previously published studies which assessed the 
same convergence. Table 8 displays the co~vergence meas-
ures found in the present study with previous studies, and 
provides strong support for the expectations described 
above. It is clear that the present measures of Positive 
Affect show a greater magnitude of association with extra-
version than do the Bradburn measures of positive affect. 
The same is true for Negative Affect as measured in the 
present fashion, where the magnitude of association with 
measures of neuroticism are clearly higher in the present 
100 
Table 8. Comparison of measures of convergence between 
Positive Affect and extraversion and Negative Affect and 
neuroticism among the present study and previously publish-
ed results. 
Affect Measures 
Present Study 
PAl 
PA2 
Costa and 
McCrea (1980)a 
Bradburn's 
PA 
Costa and 
McCrea (1984)b 
Bradburn's 
PA 
Warr et al. (1983)C 
Bradburn's 
PA 
E 
.57 
.48 
.20 
.36 
.31 
Personality Measures 
N E N 
-.13 NAl -.22 .62 
-.08 NA2 -.30 .66 
Bradburn's 
-.13 NA -.03 .39 
Bradburn's 
-.15 NA -.15 .45 
Bradburn's 
-.13 NA -.05 .51 
acorrelations reported are the average correlation across 
four times of testing between the Bradburn measures and the 
E and N scales from the Eysenck Personality Inventory 
(Eysenck and Eysenck, 1968). 
bcorrelations are between the Bradburn measures and the E 
and N scales of the Neuroticism-Extraversion-Openness (NEO) 
Inventory (McCrea and Costa, 1983). 
ccorrelations are between the Bradburn measures and the E 
and N scales from the EPQ (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975). 
study than in previous studies. The comparatively high 
degree of association found in the present analysis pro-
vides greater support than has ever been reported before 
for conceptualizing PA and E and NA and N as two reflec-
tions of the same phenomenon. 
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The final and most important analysis for assessing 
the central hypothesis of this study consisted of a prin-
cipal factor analysis where the EPQ E and EPQ N items were 
analyzed together with the Positive Affect and Negative 
affect terms. A plot of the eigen values again showed that 
there was a clear elbow after the second factor (see Figure 
5). With this in mind, it was found that a two-factor 
solution accounted for 41.27% of the common variance. 
After a Varimax rotation, the first factor was found to 
account for 23.8% of the common variance. Conversely, the 
second factor accounted for 17.47% of the common variance. 
If a third factor was included in this solution it would 
have only accounted for 5.55% of the common variance. 
Table 9 shows the factor loadings to this two 
factor solution. Terms and items are shown in decreasing 
magnitude of factor loading. At first glance, it can be 
seen that the orthogonal two factor solution showed a clean 
break where all of the NA and N items loaded most strongly 
on the first factor and all of the PA and E items loaded 
most strongly on the second factor. Thus, in terms of 
individual differences at the most general level, it is 
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Figure 5. Plot of the factors and corresponding eigen-
values in a principal factor analysis of the emotion terms 
and the E and N items. 
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Table 9. Factor loadings of Extraversion (E) items, Neuro-
ticism (N) items, Positive Affect terms, and Negative Aff-
ect terms on the two factor solution to a principal factor 
analysis. Terms or items are listed in order of their 
decreasing magnitude of loading and are rounded of to the 
second decimal place. 
Term or Item 
distressed 
sad 
blue 
unhappy 
lonely 
sluggish 
nervous 
jittery 
N6 
drowsy 
grouchy 
sorry 
fearful 
Nll 
N20 
sleepy 
N14 
N7 
N19 
N2 
N8 
N9 
Nl 
hostile 
N15 
NlO 
N17 
relaxed 
content 
scornful 
N4 
N13 
N16 
N18 
N5 
calm 
N21 
N3 
N22 
astonished 
N23 
at rest 
Factor 1 
.72*** 
.68*** 
.65*** 
.64*** 
.64*** 
.62*** 
.61*** 
.60*** 
.59*** 
.57*** 
.57*** 
.57*** 
.56*** 
.55*** 
.55*** 
.55*** 
.54*** 
.53*** 
.53*** 
.52*** 
.51*** 
.50*** 
.49*** 
.49*** 
.47*** 
.47*** 
.46*** 
-.44*** 
-.42*** 
.42*** 
.42*** 
.41*** 
.39*** 
.38*** 
.37*** 
-.37*** 
.36*** 
.34*** 
.25** 
.25** 
.22* 
-.12 
Factor 2 
-.15 
-.16 
-.22* 
-.26** 
-.27** 
-. 19 
.01 
-.05 
.09 
-.09 
-.23* 
.05 
-.08 
-.12 
-.20 
-.05 
-.13 
.15 
-.11 
.07 
-.14 
-.12 
-.06 
-.07 
-.19 
.06 
-.12 
.21* 
.37*** 
-.10 
-.18 
-.08 
.06 
-.01 
-.03 
.18 
-.03 
.19 
.13 
.20 
.05 
• 1 1 
Table 9 (cont.) 
Term or Item 
peppy 
excited 
enthusiastic 
active 
E3 
E13 
E23 
E21 
Ell 
happy 
aroused 
E2 
E6 
quiet 
elated 
E15 
E9 
E12 
E4 
E22 
pleased 
strong 
satisfied 
E5 
E8 
ElO 
surprised 
warmhearted 
still 
El 
E7 
E20 
E18 
kindly 
E14 
E12 
E17 
Factor 1 
.06 
.07 
-.04 
-.26** 
-.04 
-.10 
-.00 
-.11 
.02 
-.36*** 
.16 
-.01 
-.21* 
.17 
.01 
-.03 
-.14 
-.12 
-.18 
-.04 
-.32*** 
-.09 
-.38*** 
.02 
.02 
-.15 
.20 
-.09 
.16 
-.17 
.01 
.16 
-.23* 
-.06 
-.05 
.06 
-.02 
Factor 2 
.66*** 
.65*** 
.64*** 
.62*** 
.59*** 
.59*** 
.55*** 
.55*** 
.52*** 
.51*** 
.49*** 
.48*** 
.48*** 
-.48*** 
.47*** 
.45*** 
.45*** 
.44*** 
.42*** 
.42*** 
.41*** 
.40*** 
.40*** 
.37*** 
.37*** 
.35*** 
.34*** 
.33*** 
-.32*** 
.30*** 
.30*** 
.29*** 
.23* 
.21* 
.20* 
.07 
.03 
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Note: The items are numbered by how they appear in the EPQ-
R (Eysenck, et al., 1986) and items that were added to the 
E and N scale in this revised version have been omitted 
from the analyses (eg. E16, E19, and N24). *** ~ < .001. 
** ~ < .01. * ~ < .05. 
(All significance levels are Bonferroni corrected to reduce 
the probability of Type I error.) 
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indicated that the dimension of Negative Affect is equiva-
lent to the dimension of neuroticism, while Positive Affect 
is equivalent to the dimension of extraversion. 
Figure 6 is a plot of the emotion terms and the E 
and N items, and helps to clarify the results of the final 
hypothesis. The neuroticism items cluster with terms which 
denote high Negative Affect and Unpleasantness. As such 
the personality construct of neuroticism incorporates emo-
tional components of high Negative Affect and Unpleasant-
ness. However, it is the terms of high Negative Affect and 
neuroticism which most cleanly define the vertical dimen-
sion in this solution and, therefore, as hypothesized, it 
is high Negative Affect which is most intertwined with 
neuroticism. Extraversion can be seen to be a broader 
construct than neuroticism (judging from the spread of item 
loadings), and it incorporates emotional components of 
Pleasantness and high Positive Affect. However, it is the 
extraversion items and the high Positive Affect terms which 
most cleanly load on the second dimension, and, as hypoth-
esized, it is they that serve to define the horizontal di-
mension within this solution. Emotional terms of Strong 
Engagement are components of both extraversion/high Posi-
tive Affect and neuroticism/high Negative Affect. In like 
fashion, emotional terms of Pleasantness were found to be a 
combination of extraversion/high Positive Affect and low 
neuroticism/low Negative Affect. 
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Figure 6. Plot of the emotion terms and the EPQ E and N 
items on the first two orthogonal dimensions from a 
principal factor analysis. • denotes an emotion term; 
0 denotes an extraversion item; 0 denotes a neuroticism 
item. 
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By including the dimension of personality into the 
analysis, the relationship between some of the emotional 
terms was further clarified. For example, while terms that 
denote Unpleasantness continued to cluster with the dimen-
sion of neuroticism/Negative Affect, the terms grouchy and 
blue now significantly loaded in a negative direction on 
the extraversion/Positive Affect dimension. Thus, the 
Unpleasantness terms became more differentiated from the 
high Negative Affect terms by the inclusion of the person-
ality dimensions. In addition, the terms relaxed and at 
rest no longer loaded significantly on the dimension of 
extraversion/Positive Affect, and it appeared more clear 
that calm, relaxed, and at rest denoted pure states of low 
neuroticism (stability)/low Negative Affect. It can be 
seen then that low Negative Affect and Unpleasantness in 
the final analysis fall more in line with the Watson and 
Tellegen model of affect. 
It may reasonably be argued that the content 
overlap between the EPQ items and the emotion terms 
significantly altered the placement of emotion terms when 
they were placed in the combined analysis, thereby invali-
dating the conclusion that was drawn above. However, a 
quantitative analysis of where the emotional terms were 
placed on the two dimensions across both the combined 
factor analysis (EPQ items and emotional terms) and the 
individual factor analysis (only the "General" emotion 
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questionnaire), showed that this was not the case. It was 
found that the correlation between factor loadings for each 
of the 35 terms across both analyses correlated .997 on the 
Negative Affect dimension, and .978 on the Positive Affect 
dimension. Thus, even though the factor structure was 
clarified by the inclusion of the personality dimensions, 
it was not distorted. 
As an additional note, it is worth pointing out 
that the emotion terms in both factor analyses tended to 
cluster together rather than to spread themselves out 
evenly across the two dimensional space. This finding 
argues against the theories which attempt to define 
emotional structure on a circumplex model. 
DISCUSSION 
Results fr.om the present analysis supported the 
major hypotheses of this study. It was shown over a wide 
range of emotional terms that the structure of mood at the 
broadest level is best represented by two dimensions. 
These two dimensions accounted for the majority of the 
replicable variance and were clearly seen as dimensions of 
Positive Affect and Negative Affect. These two dimensions 
of affect showed a high level of convergence with the 
personality dimensions of extraversion and neuroticism 
(respectively) when assessed in a multitrait-multimethod 
matrix. Finally, it was demonstrated through a factor 
analysis which combined both the emotional terms and the 
personality items that this convergence was due to the fact 
that Positive Affect and extraversion define a common 
dimension of individual differences, as do Negative Affect 
and neuroticism. 
While all of the major hypotheses received support 
from the data, one unresolved issue at this point is the 
fact that a number of emotional terms were in a position 
that was significantly different from that which was 
expected on the basis of the Watson and Tellegen model. In 
particular, the terms that were proposed to define low 
Positive Affect (drowsy, sleepy, and sluggish, in addition 
to dull which was not used in this analysis) and Disengage-
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ment (quiet and still, and guiescent which was also 
excluded from this· analysis} did not fall in line with 
hypotheses. 
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It could conceivably be argued that the number of 
subjects for this analysis was less than ideal or that 
there were idiosyncracies within the sample population (ie. 
higher than expected neuroticism scores, especially for 
males; the terms dull, placid, and guiescent needing to be 
dropped} which caused the observed structure of affect to 
differ from the hypothesized structure. If these criti-
cisms were valid, it would limit the generalities that can 
be drawn from the present study. To counter these poten-
tial criticisms further evidence from other sources would 
be needed if it was to be argued that the observed struc-
ture of affect is more correct than the hypothesized 
structure of affect. 
It was stated earlier that the N and E dimensions, 
as distal variables, could help explain the emotional 
structure that emerged in the present analysis if this 
structure was not consistent with the Watson and Tellegen 
model. In order to explain the observed results, it is 
necessary to examine more closely the dimensions of E and 
N, as well as the evidence that Watson and Tellegen used 
when determining the placement of emotional terms in their 
model. 
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To begin, the loadings for the terms quiet and 
still could not be assessed quantitatively between this 
analysis and any other two-factor solution of emotional 
space. In the Watson and Tellegen (1985) study, factor 
loadings across the nine reanalyzed studies were not 
provided. However, it was reported that still was a 
significant marker of low Negative Affect in one study. 
Quiet, on the other hand, was reported to be a significant 
marker of low Positive Affect in two studies. Quiescent, 
the other term hypothesized to define Disengagement, was 
reported to be a significant marker of low Negative Affect 
in one study and a significant marker of low Positive 
Affect in another study. It is apparent then that the 
placement of these terms as markers of Disengagement was 
made with some ambiguity present, and may have reflected 
the authors' best guess, given the available evidence. 
However, if evidence from the distal personality 
dimensions of E and N is included, a different picture 
emerges. A look at Figure 2 reveals that Eysenck and 
Eysenck (1975) had placed the label quiet at precisely the 
place it was found in the current analysis (see Figure 6), 
on the dimensions that are now seen to be extraversion/Pos-
itive Affect and neuroticism/Negative Affect. In describ-
ing the dimension of extraversion, Eysenck and Eysenck 
(1975) state that the "typical introvert (or low extraver-
sion/low Positive Affect person) is a guiet, retiring sort 
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of person, introspective, ... reserved ... does not like ex-
citement ... keeps his feelings under close control .... (p. 
5, italics added}." Obviously the terms guiet and still 
fit with this description more than the terms dull, drowsy, 
sleepy, or sluggish. In fact, one of the items from the 
EPQ assesses this aspect of extraversion directly by asking 
"Are you mostly quiet when you are with other people?" An 
individual's extraversion score increases if this item is 
answered "No". In sum, the term guiet (and probably still} 
would be expected to define low extraversion/low Positive 
Affect when we turn to the E and N dimensions for clarifi-
cation. 
If the affective terms guiet and still can be 
expected to define introversion/low Positive Affect, the 
next question that needs to be addressed is where the terms 
drowsy, sleepy, sluggish and dull should have been expected 
to fall. Returning to the nine studies reanalyzed by Wat-
son and Tellegen (1985} it was found that the term sluggish 
significantly defined low Positive Affect in six studies, 
sleepy defined low Positive Affect in five studies, drowsy 
defined low Positive Affect in three studies, and dull 
defined low Positive Affect in two studies. These terms 
were not found to significantly define any other dimension 
across the nine studies. However, it should also be noted 
that the terms blue, sad, grouchy, sorry, and unhappy were 
all also reported to define low Positive Affect (in up to 
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five studies). These latter terms, which were hypothesized 
by Watson and Tellegen to be Unpleasantness terms, were 
never reported to load significantly on high Negative 
Affect, as would have been expected from their position in 
Figure 1. It is unclear why terms of Unpleasantness and 
low Positive Affect showed the same pattern of placement 
across the reanalyzed studies, yet were placed at different 
positions in the final Watson and Tellegen model. 
In the Zevon and Tellegen (1982) ~-type factor 
analysis, which is the only published study that included 
factor loadings for terms of Positive and Negative Affect, 
the terms sleepy and sluggish loaded on Positive Affect 
(-.40 and -.50, respectively) which is consistent with 
their placement. However, they also showed a sizable 
loading on Negative Affect (.23 and .30, respectively). 
Thus, it appears that in at least one instance, these terms 
showed a positive relationship with the neuroticism/Nega-
tive Affect dimension. This is an indication that they may 
have been reasonably placed in the Unpleasantness quadrant 
of the Watson and Tellegen model. 
Additional indications that these terms have a 
significant association, and possibly their most important 
association, with the neuroticism/Negative Affect dimen-
sion, comes from the descriptions of E and N. It was 
indicated above that these terms do not fit with the 
picture that the Eysencks portray of the introvert. 
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However, these terms do appear to describe the typical 
neurotic or high emotional individual. The high N individ-
ual is characterized as one who 11 is likely to sleep badly 11 
(Eysenck and Eysenck, p. 5), presumably as he or she 
anxiously worries about things done, or things that may go 
wrong. In fact, when an analysis of the EPQ N items was 
conducted, it was found that several of the N items tap 
directly into the emotional terms of drowsy, dull, sleepy, 
and sluggish. All of the following items, when answered 
11 Yes 11 serve to increase the total neuroticism score: 11 no 
you suffer from sleeplessness? 11 ; 11 Have you often felt 
listless and tired for no reason? 11 ; 11 Are you sometimes 
bubbling over with energy and sometimes very sluggish? 11 ; 
and, 11 no you often feel life is very dull?". (The above 
questions are denoted N13, N14, N22, and N15, respectively 
in Table 9.) 
Given this evidence, it appears that the inclusion 
of these distal dimensions of personality has again served 
to clarify the relationships that should be observed in a 
two factor model of emotional structure. Rather than 
expecting these terms to reflect only low PA/introversion, 
it appears clear that they should show a strong relation-
ship to neuroticism/high NA - as they did in this analysis. 
Following just the factor analysis of the terms on 
the emotion questionnaire(s), it may have been concluded 
that there were significant biases in the present sample of 
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subjects, which in turn biased the results to the point 
that they were not in line with the Watson and Tellegen 
hypotheses. In contrast to this conclusion, the descrip-
tive analysis given above, which extends the convergent 
lines of research discussed earlier and builds upon the 
results of the present factor analysis, shows that the 
observed emotional structure is in fact a sensible and 
meaningful one. The work of Watson and Tellegen did much 
to systematize mood research at the broad factor level, and 
allowed for the conceptual connection with the E and N 
dimensions of personality to be made. This conceptual 
connection was, in turn, another step in the process of 
clarifying mood structure and helped to further clarify the 
particulars of a two-factor model of emotional structure. 
Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1984) recently 
declared: 
research is needed to explicate the meaning of 
these basic mood factors ... to determine whether 
Positive and Negative Affect reflect causally potent, 
biologically based processes, or whether they are 
merely descriptive summaries of the observed covari-
ations among facial expressions and mood terms {p. 
128). 
The present research has responded to this call and has 
found evidence that the dimensions of Positive and Negative 
Affect reflect causally potent and biologically determined 
forces, though by a much different route than has previ-
ously been taken. 
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To summarize: all of the major hypotheses of this 
study were confirmed. First, it was again found that the 
two dominant dimensions of affect in an orthogonal simple 
structure factor analytic solution were Positive Affect and 
Negative Affect. Second, it was shown that PA and NA had a 
stronger convergent relationship with extraversion and 
neuroticism, respectively, than had been reported previ-
ously with Bradburn's measure of positive affect and 
negative affect. Third, it was revealed that the strong 
convergence observed between the dimensions of PA and E and 
NA and N was due to both the affect measures and the 
personality measures tapping the same individual differ-
ences. As discussed in the Introduction, the model of 
affect put forth by Watson and Tellegen (1985) was "redis-
covering" the dimensions previously outlined by Eysenck. 
Finally, by employing the well validated and extensively 
researched dimensions of E and N as distal variables, the 
model of affective structure put forth by Watson and 
Tellegen (1985) was further clarified. It was shown that 
the characteristic emotions of quiet and still disengage-
ment are more fruitfully conceived of as moods that denote 
low E/low PA; while characteristic feelings of sluggish-
ness, drowsiness, and sleepiness are best seen as manifes-
tations of high N/high NA. 
The findings from this study are important because 
they once again display the salience and prominence of 
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these two particular dimensions of human nature, first 
described by the Ancient Greeks. Eysenck's dimensions of E 
and N hardly need further experimental support for their 
viability as broad and replicable individual differences. 
However, it is encouraging to see that these same two 
dimensions began to emerge from a discrete field of study 
(that of affective structure) when there were no ~priori 
hypotheses about their existence. 
Of primary importance, this study made a conceptual 
link which bridges the previously existing gap between the 
literatures of affect and personality. Researchers simp-
lify and bring clarity to their field of study through a 
process of refining categories that represent phenomena in 
the "real world". One traditional distinction that has 
been made in the study of adults is the distinction between 
emotion and personality. Personality is generally consid-
ered the long-standing and stable traits that make up a 
person's character. Emotions, on the other hand, are 
generally considered variable and transient fluctuations in 
character which are more responsive to external events than 
personality. This is a reasonable distinction to be made 
and one that should continue to be made. However, it is 
important to be aware that these categories are simplifi-
cations imposed upon the "real world'' of experience. For 
example, research on children generally does not make the 
same distinction between emotions and personality that 
research on adults does. Rather, a child's character is 
discussed as temperament, a term which merges the above 
dichotomy, as temperament describes the long-standing 
emotional responses which typify the child's interaction 
with the world. 
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The current research indicates that the same merger 
of concepts can be made for adults, as the broad dimensions 
which give rise to the personality traits of E and N also 
give rise to the emotional factors of Positive Affect and 
Negative Affect. This merger of concepts is obviously 
easiest to make when a person's general, or trait, emotion 
is examined. At this level of analysis, one would be hard 
pressed in an attempt to sort out what is "personality" and 
what is a person's "typical mood". However, it was also 
shown in this study that the same emotional structure 
emerged both under response conditions where subjects rated 
their "general" emotional character and under response 
conditions where subjects rated their recent, or "current" 
emotional state. The equivalence of structure under both 
state and trait conditions can be seen as an indication 
that there are two primary modes which organize, or 
predispose, experiences to fall along a positive or 
negative affective valence. 
At the "state" level of analysis, experiences are 
more variable and transient, yet still differ along these 
two dimensions. It is likely that at the "state" level of 
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analysis one would not feel both the emotions of high 
Positive Affect and high Negative Affect at the same time. 
Thus, the dimensions would be less independent at this 
level of analysis. 
At the "trait" level of analysis, the two dimen-
sions remain constant. However, what changes at this level 
is the percentage of time that a person spends at a 
particular point on the two dimensions. There is a 
tendency for individuals to adopt a characteristic position 
on each of these two dimensions, and this position is seen 
by both their "general emotional traits" and by their 
"personality". Further, the trait position that is adopted 
on each dimension is likely to be mediated by individual 
differences in the reticular arousal system (for extraver-
sion/Positive Affect) and the limbic system (for neuroti-
cism/Negative Affect). Additionally, at the "trait" level 
of analysis, these dimensions would be expected to be 
independent of each other (ie., whether or not a large 
proportion of time is spent experiencing high Positive 
Affect, says nothing about whether one also experiences a 
large proportion of high Negative Affect). 
SUMMARY 
The psychological literature on affective struc-
ture, since its inception in the 1950's, has been charac-
terized by confusion and disagreement over the number and 
nature of factors that are basic to emotional experience. 
Recently, however, a two-factor model of Positive and 
Negative Affect has emerged in this literature which has 
been repeatedly found to accurately describe the dimensions 
of affect at the broadest level of analysis. Despite the 
advances that have been made with this model, the precise 
delineation of emotional terms to define each of the two 
independent dimensions (eg. Watson and Tellegen, 1985) was 
believed to be incomplete. Rather, it was believed that 
the two-factor model of affect was "rediscovering" the 
extraversion (E) and neuroticism (N) dimensions of person-
ality detailed by Eysenck (1981), and if this hypothesis is 
correct, it was believed that the personality dimensions of 
E and N could further clarify the terms which should be 
expected to define the dimensions of Positive and Negative 
Affect. 
The analysis of this contention proceeded by 
several means. First, many studies which assessed the 
interface of mood and personality were systematically 
organized. Through this procedure it was shown that the 
dimensions of Positive Affect and extraversion and Negative 
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Affect and neuroticism had similar patterns of influence on 
other variables. Second, it was hypothesized that, experi-
mentally, two dimensions, one of Positive Affect (PA) and 
one of Negative Affect (NA), should emerge in a factor 
analysis of 35 mood terms. Additionally, it was predicted 
that a scale of PA should show a high association with E 
and little association with N and NA. In like fashion, a 
scale of NA was predicted to show a high association with N 
and little association with E and PA. 
Two hundred and thirty one subjects filled out a 
questionnaire which assessed their general emotional 
character, as well as the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire 
(EPQ, Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975), which assess the dimen-
sions of E and N. Both of these questionnaires were 
factored by a principal factor analysis and it was found 
that a two-factor solution accurately accounted for the 
replicable variance within each analysis. These two-factor 
solutions were then rotated to orthogonal simple structure. 
The E and N dimensions clearly emerged from the analysis of 
the EPQ. Additionally, a dimension of positive affect and 
a dimension of negative affect clearly emerged from the 
emotion questionnaire. Even though these dimensions did 
not exactly conform to the Watson and Tellegen model, they 
were shown to be stable, robust, and replicable dimensions 
of Positive and Negative Affect. By correlating all tour 
scales (E, PA, N, NA) in a multitrait-multimethod matrix, 
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it was found that there was a stronger convergence between 
E and PA, and N and NA, than had ever been reported in the 
literature previously. Additionally, there was little 
association across constructs, which indicated strong 
divergent validity. 
The next step in the analysis was to factor the 
emotional terms and personality items together. Since it 
was argued that the two-dimensional structure of mood was 
"rediscovering" the dimensions of E and N, it was predicted 
that two large factors should emerge in this analysis, with 
one factor defined by N items and NA terms and the other 
factor defined by E items and PA terms. An orthogonal two-
factor solution showed the expected pattern of results, and 
supported the major hypothesis of the present study. 
Finally, the salience of E and N, as distal vari-
ables (Scarr, 1985), helped to explain the precise terms 
which should be expected to define a two-dimensional model 
of affect. It was argued that the Watson and Tellegen 
model of affect was correct in its essentials, but erred in 
the placement of a number of specific emotional terms. In 
particular, the use of the E and N dimensions clarified the 
terms which denote low Positive Affect, as well as the 
terms which denote Unpleasantness. 
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Bradburn's (1969) Affect Balance Scale 
(Note: items on the actual questionnaire were intermixed) 
During the past few weeks did you ever feel ..... 
(Positive feelings:) 
1. Pleased about having accomplished something? 
2. That things were going your way? 
3. Proud because someone complimented you on 
something you had done? 
4. Particularly excited or interested in something? 
5 .. On top of the world? 
(Negative feelings:) 
1. So restless that you couldn't sit long in a chair? 
2. Bored? 
3. Depressed or very unhappy? 
4. Very lonely or remote from other people? 
5. Upset because someone criticized you? 
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CODE ·------------------
Listed below are various ways that we all feel. This Questionnaire is si•ply 
designed to see how you Q~~~~~l~ feel with regards to the terms listed below. 
There are no "right" or "wrong" ways to feel, rather, we all experience 
emotions in different ways and to different degrees. Please rate as honestly 
as possible the degree to which each of the following terms describes how you 
Q~~~~~l~ feel. To do this use the following scale. 
0 = very unlike me (VUM) 
1 =unlike me (UM) 
2 = like me (LM) 
3 very like me (VLM) 
Please complete all of the items. Thank you. 
1) ca 1m 0 2 3 21) warmhearted 
2) dis~ressed 0 2 3 22) active 
3) astonished 0 2 3 23) scornful 
4) surprised 0 2 3 24) lonely 
5) elated 0 2 3 25) satisfied 
6) quiet 0 2 3 26) hostile 
7) unhappy 0 2 3 27) kindly 
8) sluggish 0 2 3 28) enthusiastic 
9) at rest 0 2 3 29) quiescent 
10) aroused 0 2 3 30) drowsy 
11) dull 0 2 3 31) happy 
12) s~ill 0 2 3 32) content 
13) fearful 0 2 3 33) pleased 
14) sorry 0 2 3 34) sad 
15) Jittery 0 2 3 35) placid 
16) relaxed 0 2 3 36) sleepy 
17) grouchy 0 2 3 37) blue 
18) excited 0 2 3 38) strong 
19) nervous 0 2 3 39) impulsive 
20) peppy 0 2 3 40) anxious 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 3 
CODE # 
------------------
Listed below are various ways that we all feel. This questionnaire is simply 
designed to see how you have felt i~-~b~-~~~~-q~ with regards to the terms 
listed below. There are no "right" or "wrong" ways to feel. rather. we all 
experience emotions in different ways and to different degrees. Please rate 
as honestly as possible the degree to which each of the following terms 
describes how you have felt_i~-~b~-~~~~-q~ feel. To do this use the follow-
ing scale. 
0 very unlike me (VUM) 
1 = unlike me (UM) 
2 like me ( LM) 
3 very like me (VLM) 
Please complete all of the items. Thank you. 
1) calm 0 2 3 21) warmhearted 
2) distressed 0 2 3 22) active 
3) astonished 0 2 3 23) scornful 
4) surprised 0 2 3 24) lonely 
5) elated 0 2 3 25) satisfied 
6) quiet 0 2 3 26) host.i le 
7) unhappy 0 2 3 27) kindly 
8) sluggish 0 2 3 28) enthusiastic 
9) at rest 0 2 3 29) quiescent 
10) aroused 0 2 3 30) drowsy 
11) dull 0 2 3 31) happy 
12) still 0 2 3 32) content 
13) fearful 0 2 3 33) pleased 
14) sorry 0 2 3 34) sad 
15) Jittery 0 2 3 35) placid 
16) relaxed 0 2 3 36) sleepy 
17) grouchy 0 2 37) blue 
18) excited 0 2 3 38) strong 
19) nervous 0 2 3 39) impulsive 
20) peppy 0 2 3 40) anxious 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2 3 
0 2. 3 
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